The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XII New York, Saturday, September 1, 1917 Number 148

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IN defining to the Pope the basis of a satisfactory peace President Wilson has not only clarified the main purpose of the war but has incalculably advanced the prospect of its attainment. In his reply he has wisely declined to dally with the possible details of negotiation. He has gone from its aims to its roots and established beyond any need for revision the species of qualification that alone will enable the Central Powers to come to a conference. Those who could see no end to the war but a knock-out will either be disappointed in the President's answer or will profess to find in his denunciation of intolerable wrongs a refusal to think of any international adjustment. There is not one trace of this weak truculence in the firm tone that the President has taken, and in speaking for the adjustment that must precede Germany's approach to negotiation he has cleared his cause of vindictiveness no less than he has defined it as unflinching, comprehensible and attainable. It is not a cause that requires for its fulfilment the crushing of the German people or an impossible continuance of the sacrifice of life. President Wilson has conclusively emancipated the liberal peoples for whom he has spoken from any hysterical military program. It is his triumph as the statesman entrusted to be the interpreter of liberal purposes that he has not gone one step beyond the unqualified military resolution of his country either as to the democratic program he has enunciated or as to the democratic process by which alone it can be guaranteed.

IT is no merely governmental peace with which the President will be satisfied. The present German government, unlike the governments of the Allies, is not responsible to the people over which it rules. A peace made with it could not be an enduring peace. For it has become fundamental to involve in the settlement the faith of the belligerent peoples, and that faith must be given democratic expression in the institutions under which they live. An irresponsible German government, that is to say, prevents the real German popular will from responsible institutional action. With the German people well organized the President is willing to make peace; and he offers important pledges in return for such democratization. He will not fight to impair the sovereignty of the German people. He desires a peace in which there shall be no punitive damages. No belligerent is to suffer economic exclusion of any kind. The President, in fact, is asking an assurance in return for specific American guaranties. He is asking the German people to give positive proof that their own faith and their own goodwill are not only highly involved in whatever offer of peace may come from the German government, but also that the German people have the means to enforce the expression of their desire. He places, in fact, the disposition of peace or war in the hands of that people. Our task is to await with eager anxiety the evidence of its purposes.

THERE is increasing evidence that the cleavage envisaged by the President between the will of the German government and that of the German people is in no sense chimerical. Herr

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Erzberger has refused to accept the Chancellor's affirmation of honesty in his adoption of the Reichstag peace formula. Herr Scheidemann not only accuses the German government of dishonest evasion on the submarine issue but has insisted that the democratization of Germany is the necessary condition of peace. Even the National Liberals have begun to desert the pan-annexationists. Men like Theodor Wolff have emphasized their conviction that Germany is still a feudal nation and have demanded the immediate cession of free government. In the twilight world of conflicting opinions shadowed by the rigorous German censorship it may be that we deal rather with tendencies than with certainties. But to those tendencies the President has offered a premium of the first importance. He has offered to German democracy the prospect of an immediate and stable peace in return for a successful agitation. He has given them the stimulus to an effort that should be revivified and inspired by this prospect of a certain goal. No one in Germany will mistake the significance of this. It is now obvious that German liberalism is provided with a definite and tangible program. The idea of a settlement which shall be both possible and desirable is thus made far more real and far more concrete than at any previous stage of the war.

ECONOMIC war after the war has received its final quietus. When peace is made, it will be made with a German people established in the control of its own foreign policy. All reason for trade discriminations against such a reorganized Germany disappears. At the time of the Paris economic conference it was assumed that however the war might end, the German people would remain subject to a pernicious clique of military leaders, titled aristocrats, political captains of industry and bankers, who would employ any commercial opportunities they might obtain as instruments of "peaceful penetration" and imperialistic intrigue. A democratized Germany, like any other democracy, will pursue its trading interests for exclusively trading ends. Its competition will be formidable, but salutary. There will be classes both in the United States and in the countries allied with us that would prefer to see German competition, even if shorn of its political purposes, handicapped for generations. Democracy can have no sympathy with this view. President Wilson gives final expression to a profound democratic conviction when he states that "the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace."

THERE will be no economic coalition against the German people. Our allies are doubtless ready to subscribe to the President's declaration, under the conditions imposed. Were they disinclined to abandon the project of excluding Germany from commercial opportunities, they would still recognize that no economic union against Germany that did not command the adherence of the United States and Russia would be of the slightest value. Equally impossible is the German project of a Central European economic union. Mitteleuropa falls under the President's ban along with the plans of the Paris Conference. A chastened and reorganized Germany will be granted peace and full privileges in world trade. A Germany still scheming to subordinate all Central Europe to her political domination will not even be granted a truce. It has been urged that mere disavowal on Germany's part of any intention of forming a selfish and exclusive economic league would have little binding significance. This would be true if the projected Central European league rested upon an economic foundation that could recommend itself to a democratic people. It did not rest upon such a foundation. Economically the advantages Germany might gain from a Central European league were as nothing compared with the disadvantages of exclusion from world trade. The animating purpose of Mitteleuropa was political: to increase the man-power at the disposal of an ambitious governmental organization that the Germans will have to overthrow if they are ever to enjoy peace.

RUSSIAN radicals are now assured that the sympathies of the United States are with them and that their aspirations for a just peace are our aspirations. The President in effect subscribes to the Russian peace formula, while giving it greater precision and proceeding beyond it to a position where the Russians must also take their stand. The President voices the American—and Russian—condemnation of punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires. Intolerable wrongs, committed by the Germans, he declares, ought to be repaired. Certainly the Russian radicals will agree to the justice of restitution for injuries wantonly inflicted upon Belgium, for wanton destruction in occupied territory. As for the war to the end declared against the ruthless, intriguing, ambitious imperialist clique temporarily in control of the German people, it is essential to the safety of both the American and the Russian democracies, but vastly more essential to Russian democracy than to American. If the present German ruling caste retains its power, the whole energy of that caste will be thrown on the side of the counter revolution.

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WHAT is important is the fact that the President's note is a point in a series and not the end of it. It affirms a policy by giving it the relief of definition. It does not reject the Papal offer. Rather it outlines the kind of background in which that offer can be made the basis of a fruitful negotiation. There is an implied but important sympathy with certain substantial issues raised by the Pope. Where the President is sceptical is of the reality of any peace made by Germany without democratic responsibility on her part. It is here that we find the starting-point of a new effort. The German reply to the Papal note has still to come, and it can be made in the light of the American reply. It can ask the President for definiteness as to his conception of democratic responsibility. It can indicate its acceptance of the general tenor of his diplomatic offer. And much must hinge on the Austrian response. Mr. Balfour has already officially suggested that the Allied attitude to Austria differs from that to Germany. The old Emperor is dead; and signs have not been wanting that under the new ruler Vienna does not work in complete harmony with Berlin. Austria has been given here a genuine opportunity for the declaration of generous purposes democratically guaranteed. She, too, can make enquiry as to the precise meaning of Mr. Wilson's demand. The President cannot shrink from an issue so deliberately defined as he has defined this issue. We have advanced to a new stage in the evolution of our policy where the decisive event may well be political in character. A full and frank responsiveness to the questions Germano-Austrian liberalism may desire to have answered will, in the perspective of the President's conception of peace, be the real turning-point in the war.

THERE is still force enough left in the Central Empires to inflict heavy military disasters upon a disorganized Russia, if this were really worth while. The extension of the German lines to Petrograd, or the Austro-Bulgarian lines to Odessa, is by no means a military impossibility. But how would such operations profit the Central Powers? Neither Petrograd nor Odessa is vital to Russia. The retiring Russians would destroy existing stocks of food, with the result that the Central Powers would have greater territories to hold with no corresponding increase in available resources. Either operation would involve a lengthening of lines of defense requiring an additional half million men. These might be found if a sufficiently favorable moral result might be anticipated. If new defeats were certain to increase the social disorders in Russia, or strengthen the separatist forces in Finland and the Ukraine, Germany might be willing to pay the price entailed in inflicting them. But it is more probable that a serious German offensive in Russia would consolidate Russian resistance. The Russian situation is a striking illustration of the impotence of military force to achieve substantial results except as an auxiliary to political and moral forces.

GERMANY'S war credits from the beginning of the war to the present moment have amounted to about $22,000,000,000. Huge as it is, this sum does not include grants of credit to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, which may well enter into the category of doubtful assets. Germany's aggregate capital wealth before the war did not greatly exceed $80,000,000,000. Her aggregate of individual incomes can hardly have exceeded $12,000,000,000. If the war were to end to-day, mere interest on the war debt would absorb ten per cent of all incomes, big and little—rather more than the total tax burden that will conveniently rest upon a people. The war is not ended, and every month adds a half a billion dollars to Germany's war debt. In the beginning the German ruling class hoped to roll the burden of debt upon a conquered enemy. This hope has long been extinct. And as the burden of debt grows, the burden of accountability upon those who willed the war becomes more tremendous. Before the German autocracy has explained away the war debt, it will have learned that no long war pays.

The Necessary Step

THE all-pervading consideration which has dominated the diplomatic situation and the approach to anything resembling negotiation is the feeling that Germany cannot be trusted, that she has in no sense been converted from the policy which caused her to provoke the war; that any peace now made would be used as a mere period of preparation for another war in which she might hope to achieve the ends she has failed to achieve in the present one. From this the "bitter enders" have concluded that the only peace which could be secure would be one imposed upon a broken and relatively powerless Germany, and that negotiation or exchange of views now can serve no purpose but to assist the German policy of a "breathing space."

Now those who, like the President, believe that every occasion like that of the Pope's note should be used to make increasingly plain to the German people the disinterested nature of Allied aims and believe that a really liberal definition of terms is an indispensable condition of the successful conduct of the war, do not necessarily minimize the vast

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danger of a powerful and unregenerate Germany, nor the perpetual menace that such must constitute to a free world. But they take the ground that the policy of refusing to state clearly and explicitly the precise meaning of such aims as "the destruction of German militarism," the "maintenance of public right," "the rights of nationality," of merely prolonging the war with the implication that Germany must surrender unconditionally or make public admission of defeat or undergo, not merely constitutional reform, but a bloody revolution, is not only militarily impossible of accomplishment, in any permanent sense, but would defeat our declared political aims if it were.

This does not mean the Allies could not by continuing the war for, it may be, some years, drive the Germans out of France and Belgium, perhaps even out of Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania, and Poland, enter German territory, break up Austria and impose upon the two chief enemy states very humiliating conditions. That is a purely military problem concerning which the experts will certainly differ. But those who may not be qualified to pronounce upon the military problem may nevertheless point out that in the light of history, of any impartial reading of human nature as revealed in the politics of nationalism, the military end just described would certainly defeat the political aims with which the western democracies entered the war.

And this, mainly for the very reasons most often urged on behalf of an imposed, "jusqueboutiste" peace. The conduct of Germany we are told has placed her outside the pale of civilization; she is an outlaw that must be punished and put under restraint, with whom there can be no treaty, no bargaining. That conduct, if the war is a long one, will get worse. The behavior of an army retreating from territory for which it has no further use is worse than that of an army advancing into territory it expects to occupy. And we know what is the German standard of the better type of conduct! Belgium and northern France (to say nothing of Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro) will be ash heaps. After such trials no Allied nation will be precisely in a judicial mood. If, in such circumstances as those of this war, the victory of the Allies is complete and smashing, it is a certainty of human nature that they will interpret reparation and restitution (to say nothing of punishment) to mean something which a generation of Germans and Austrians, just as incapable of impartial judgment, will interpret as intolerable national wrongs. To suppose that after a complete military victory, obtained at the cost of sacrifices such as those indicated, it would be possible for the Allies to resist the more extravagant claims of Italian imperialists, Serbian, Rumanian and Montenegrin nationalists, or the colonial and economic policy of British and French imperialists, implies belief in psychological and political miracles. Germans and Austrians of southeastern Europe will find themselves under the rule of victorious enemies, German industrialists will find themselves living on sufferance in an economically half closed world, controlled by enemy imperialists. The next German war would be, in those circumstances, for the coming German generation a war of liberation. To ask that a whole people shall acquiesce in the political disadvantage and economic handicap of their nation, shall admit that their fathers died in their millions for an utterly bad cause, to ask indeed that a whole people shall regard its country as deserving of "punishment," is to assume a renunciation of that religion of patriotism which has been the most powerful political impulse of our times.

The destruction of an army is a military problem; the destruction of a whole nation's power for aggression is hardly a military problem at all. Imagine that the soldier has done his work in this war as completely as you will and the existing German military machine utterly destroyed; but imagine also that at the end of a decade or two the Grand Alliance, through political incapacity, begins to disintegrate (and it will take extraordinary political wisdom to keep the alliance together) we are faced once more with the menace of German preponderance. The German population is expanding; that of France is stationary; Russia will be absorbed in her internal problems; a period of discrimination against German trade and access to raw materials will tend to make Germany self-sufficing and very little affected by blockade, with little to lose by war in the way of overseas trade. And in ten or fifteen years we have a new generation—those now in the nursery and at school—ready as the raw materials of new German armies. Given certain political, economic and social factors, the mere destruction of German armies to-day may be not merely ineffective as a means of destroying the German menace, but the actual cause—though this of course is no necessary result—of the re-creation or perpetuation of that menace.

Two compelling reasons dictate an increasing definiteness in the statement of our political aims. The first is that the various members of the Alliance may be held to their original aims and not modify them under the influence of victory. The second is that the nascent liberalism of Germany may be given a chance to develop.

To suggest that the aims of countries like England, France and Italy may change during a war implies no disbelief in the sincerity of their professions. It merely takes into account a quite obvious and undeniable fact which our limited ter-

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minology of international politics tends to obscure. English policy as directed by a Cabinet powerfully influenced by Curzons, Milners and Carsons is obviously not likely to be quite the same policy as that directed by a Cabinet entirely liberal. There are different conceptions of policy in England or Englishmen would not fight so bitterly between themselves about them. Yet we talk of the whole as a homogeneous unit—"English policy." The same is true of France or Italy. To assume that the settlement will not be influenced by all those changes of feeling which in every great country in Europe concerned in the war have been taking place before our eyes is to forsake the world of realities. War always acts as a stimulant to imperialist and national feeling. That fact should be taken into account particularly by Americans; for if we could imagine Germany so reduced that the European members of the Alliance seemed in a position to impose their will without American aid, imperialists would dominate European policy and American authority at the settlement would be of the smallest. Incidentally America would be in the weakest position to sustain at the settlement that internationalism which alone can achieve her aims in the war.

When President Wilson tells us that he is not fighting the German people but their government, and that all the vital interests of the German peoples would be promoted by Allied victory, do we quite realize that such a declaration is equivalent to saying that the whole war arises from a misunderstanding—the misunderstanding by the German people of Allied aims? For if the bulk of the German people—the soldiers and their families—really believed that all their sacrifices were for the personal ambition of a little clique whom for the most part they detest, that the Fatherland would be safer and freer and more prosperous if the German armies and navy were defeated, the war could not last a week. The army would surrender by whole divisions, submarines would sail into Allied ports without their officers, and so forth. The German people have another opinion as to what will result for them from Allied victory, and as to the nature of Allied aims. It is the popular German belief which enables the German government to use the people for its purposes. And so long as we were indefinite as to our aims and allowed the German government to represent our intentions to "destroy German militarism" as, in reality, an attempt to deprive Germans in future of any means of defending their nationality; or so long as Paris Economic Conferences furnished that government some ground for the statement that defeat will mean economic strangulation for Germany, we promoted the objects of Germany's rulers.

It has already been indicated how the Pope's message might be used as an opportunity for modifying the diplomatic situation more to the advantage of the Allies. Our reply has laid the foundation for understanding that the better international order for which America is fighting is not a mere attempt to crystalize the existing political circumstances of a world which has developed rather to Germany's disadvantage, but would ensure her an extent of economic opportunity—rights of way, access to markets and raw materials and commercial prospects overseas—which dubious military struggles could never do; would give her people national security without military servitude. The supporters of German liberalism can now present a case which sooner or later will ensure that "conversion" of the German people which alone, by all but universal admission, will render the world secure.

But this program of equal opportunity and security for all is not a simple matter. It is the most difficult piece of constructive statesmanship the world has ever faced. It will not suffice for the Allies to declare that it is their intention to put such a program into execution. What, to the Allies, might seem ample security for Germany, to Germans might seem the extreme of insecurity. League of Peace, Society of Nations, are new conceptions to the mass of western folk bred in the nationalist tradition, conceptions until yesterday derided by most Americans and Europeans as utopian, impracticable, the chimera of cranks. The Allies must at least show themselves sufficiently in earnest about these things by proof that they realize the seriousness of the difficulties.

If the European Allies can hold conferences of such doubtful diplomatic utility and wisdom as the Economic Conference of Paris in 1916, surely it should be possible to arrange firstly for a great inter-Allied conference that should concentrate mainly upon the one object which the Pope has put in the forefront of his message: the means and method of this better international order which has become the universally recognized need. And if that conference should be a conference of peoples or parliaments as well as a conference of governments, should in fact be an Allied parliament capable of expansion into the future international parliament, German liberals and social democrats would see in it an opportunity not only of democratizing their foreign relations but of fortifying their own parliamentary institutions. If such a parliament now existed and were the medium of inter-Allied political discussion, the demand that Germany adopt the same method of international representation, would make the Entente Powers the political allies of the German people in their struggle for parliamentary institutions. And a like consideration

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would apply to the minorities and subject populations of Austria.

Such a step towards international organization would give a greater chance to subject nationalities the world over, and some hope of the vindication of their rights, without the establishment of absolute independencies, which are certainly unworkable in our modern world. It might be possible to devise a plan, for instance, under which, while the Central Powers should retain certain controls as a guaranty of their freedom of economic movement in the case of Alsace or a Jugo-Slav state, the right of military conscription should depend upon the will of the populations in question. It is a policy which Great Britain has, by the fact, applied to Ireland. Such a policy, supported, as it would be, by the populations concerned, might make it possible to accord to the Germanic people the freest economic development and scope for the largest administrative organization, without having those things turned to the purposes of a menacing military power.

But none of these things is even remotely possible if every attempt to add to our military forces the moral and political forces up to the present so ill used, is to be misrepresented as pacifism, or pro-Germanism, or "peace talk." The temper of intolerance is a bad counsellor.

Changing the German Temper

WHATEVER practical result the Papal offer may have, one great benefit it has already effected. It is now clear to all the world that the main emphasis of peace is prospective in character. It is the kind of world in which we are to live after the war that has now become important. The use to which a German defeat is to be put has a significance hardly less important than the fact of defeat itself.

If the hypothesis of German inspiration be at all accurate it is clear that the Papal note indicates the maximum salvage hoped for by the Central Powers. Those who look to the permanent stabilization of European politics can see that the terms themselves are as yet unsatisfactory. But it is not in the possibility of immediate and final settlement that their importance consists. Their importance comes rather from the obvious realization on the part of Germany that the old Europe is dead and that she must dream new dreams. Pan-Germanism has received its quietus. Terms such as these cannot, even at their maximum, find any glad re-echo in the hearts of men like Reventlow and von Tirpitz. They imply that Germany is weary of the struggle. They bear on their surface the admission that the territorial settlement must express itself in terms of the Allied ideals. Germany may hold out a little longer; she may even have some desultory military success. But the ultimate issue is no longer matter for speculation.

To realize that she has been beaten in the large aspect of her effort is already sign of returning sanity on the part of Germany. What it needs on our part is a quick appreciation of her changing temper. What we have to do is so to strengthen by our efforts the reviving forces of German liberalism, that after the war their eventual predominance shall be secure. It will need much self-restraint. The impulse to vengeance for the wrong committed is easy and natural. It is being said with determination that there can be no peace with an autocratic Germany. Demand is made that she atone for her crime. But it is important to insist that nothing but a formal change in the German government can be imposed by force of arms. Any really significant change must come out of forces within the German people itself. We can stimulate those forces or we can weaken them. In any event we must operate through them.

It is in its results only that the form of German government concerns us. And if one thing is very certain, it is that the main factor in Germany to-day which operates against the progress of liberalism is her isolation from the rest of Europe. Let her come once more into contact with France and Russia and England; let her see that the promises of autocracy have not been fulfilled, and we have a far more satisfactory guaranty of a democratization of German institutions than a forcible but insincere adoption of our demand. There is evidence and to spare of the growing impatience of important sections of German opinion with the present régime. But nothing conduces more to the arrest of its advance than idle talk of compulsion upon what the German people regards as a domestic issue. In the certain absence of real knowledge as to the Allied intentions, it is fatally easy for her bureaucracy to represent our aspirations as in fact an assault upon the national existence of Germany. We have no means of allaying those fears save by a scrupulous moderation. The issue that hangs upon our forbearance is surely too vast for us to act with so uncritical a misunderstanding of the German temper. It is too like her own neglect of national psychology.

So, too, with the argument from justice. In the physical sense, Germany can never atone for what she has done. To attempt the solution of this problem in territorial or financial terms is simply a huckster's solution. To think that any real compensation for the agony of Belgium is to be gained from beating Germany into abject humility is piti-

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fully to mistake the grandeur of Belgium's sacrifice. So to treat Germany would be to make certain the failure of any permanent organization against war. It would be to infect her with that feeling of baulked disposition which, as Mr. Graham Wallas has pointed out, lies deep at the root no less of national than of personal wrongdoing.

That does not mean that we are to go back to the status quo ante, and give Germany a clean bill of health. The memories of the past no less than the needs of the future very clearly make that impossible. No peace will make the Kaiser popular in Belgium or convince the German people of its deep guilt whether it be made to-day or years from now. The attempt to make the peace terms a moral judgment is, from the outset, doomed to failure. It is doomed to failure for the simple reason that, morally speaking, there is not sufficient meeting of the minds between the Allies and Germany to make the latter at all careful of the good opinion of Europe. That change we must rather hope to effect after the conclusion of peace. It is when, in a world that has been restored by peace to good will, the Germans come into contact with the mind of Europe and of America, when they realize that, all over the world their policy has been condemned by the thoughts of humble men unmoved by jealousy or ambition or ill-will that the sense of what they have done will dawn upon them. It is in the moral isolation in which they then stand that their desire for expiation will be born.

It is for the creation of that atmosphere that we must be mainly concerned. What we have consistently to search for are the conditions upon which its advent must be hastened. Clearly the one sure path to take is avoidance of what suggests international punitive damages. The causes at work before this war which could produce in Germany her imperialistic temper will strengthen it rather than destroy it. Ensure, for example, her economic destruction and she will fight, as now, with the recklessness of a lone wolf at bay. Threaten her national unity, and she will be provided for the first time with a genuine casus belli. It is not upon such terms that permanent peace can be effected.

Germany, clearly enough, is living to-day under the doom of fear. Her temper, her expedients, her gestures, all of them proclaim the state that has lost its moral balance. There should be no ground for that attitude. None of us wants the destruction of Germany. The peace for which we are working should promise that which will make her the partner in the prospects of our common civilization if she is willing to accept the conditions upon which that life is lived. To realize that, she must be in a mood to reason calmly. Let us ensure her what common prudence demands and she can awaken from her evil dream. But she will then see that the economic background of peace must be based upon territorial rearrangement. If domination has failed, coöperation must follow. If she cannot defeat the world, she must accept the world. In that mood it is possible to make effective settlement of our problems.

And to that mood, if we are careful, she will be driven. Swiftly she is being outmatched in economic resources; less swiftly, but none the less surely, she is being outmatched in military resources. Our progress in both aspects must be relentless in its purpose. But it must also be unembittered. It must have as its object an honorable reconstruction of Europe and not such treatment of Germany as will whet her appetite for revenge. The fear of her will pass away when she accepts the common ideals of democracy. She will accept them when the effort of the Hohenzollern is seen to be an empty ambition. Any peace that does not safeguard Europe is, of course, impossible; any peace that attempted more would be disastrous. If the great aim is secure, the kind of vision the President of the United States revealed in his address to Congress on the Declaration of War can be given effective realization. It will need self-restraint and self-sacrifice on our part. It will mean a willingness to forgive even if we remember. But no one who keeps steadily in mind the richness of its promise can doubt that it is worth the cost.

Toward Industrial Democracy

LIKE the war itself, competition after the war will be a contest of nations. Nations divided against themselves, nations in which employers organize to beat down labor, in which labor is forced to resort to ca' canny and malingering to protect itself against the degradation of sporadic unemployment will go down before nations in which the unifying ideal of national service survives the conflict of guns. The nations of Europe to-day are concentrating almost as much energy and brains upon the problems of permanent industrial reconstruction as they are upon the prosecution of the war itself. In the field of industrial preparedness for the war after the war, they are as far ahead of America as they are in military organization. There is real danger that having entered the war late America may still be in the thick of military preoccupations when peace comes, while her economic rivals—France and England as well as Germany—will be on the mark and set for a running start for the capture of world markets.

In his article on Representative Government in

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British Industry, published on another page of this issue, Mr. J. A. Hobson shows how far England has distanced us in her preparation for the war after the war. While our government is still groping toward policies and wrestling with the formation of committees for the prosecution of the war, the Reconstruction Committee of the British Cabinet has matured a program whose reception by representative employers and labor leaders in England "is as noteworthy as the proposal itself." While our shipbuilding yards have been crippled by the refusal of the organized employers and the federal Shipping Board to "recognize" the unions, while our lumber industry and copper fields are torn by civil war because of the stubborn individualism of employers who oppose collective bargaining "on principle," while the quartermaster's department of the army has let contracts for uniforms to sweatshops because in the eyes of the army "unions do not exist," while "big business" generally maintains a defiantly feudal attitude toward labor,—in England "all classes appear to be willing and even anxious to apply the principle of representative self-government not only to the conduct of the great trades but to their constituent businesses." Three years ago industrial England was plagued by the same bitter antagonisms, the same smouldering hostility that is abroad in industrial America to-day. But the war with its call to national service has drawn men together; it has so deepened the faith of the English people in democracy that they are willing, even anxious, to apply it to their domestic business while fighting for its establishment as the essential basis of international comity.

If the proposal of the Reconstruction Committee is put into practice, collective bargaining on a national scale will become the dominant and accepted policy of British industrial life. But the proposal implies something more than collective bargaining, as we in America know it. With us the associations of collective bargaining are negative and inhibitory rather than constructively dynamic. Collective agreements as we know them are usually the by-products of lockouts and strikes; they specify the terms of an armed truce rather than a working co-partnership. They are likely to be permeated by the spirit of our own anti-trust laws which frown upon organization and tolerate it only when they must. The recognition of organization, whether of labor or capital, as a life-giving force rather than a national peril, is basic to the proposal of the British Reconstruction Committee. Mr. Hobson points out that "one certain and early result of the experiment will be the formation of syndicates or cartels, mitigating or suspending competition between businesses" in the same trade. With industries organized on a national scale both on the side of management and on the side of labor, the Joint Standing Industrial Councils will serve as national legislative and judicial bodies with comprehensive home-rule powers within their trades and subject to Parliament as the policy-making instrument of all the people in all the trades. All industries so organized will acquire the recognized status of public services in which the conditions of employment will be subject to the joint democratic control of employers and employees.

The wider implications of this arrangement from the point of view of productive economy, Mr. Hobson suggests when he says that "though the settlement of differences between capital and labor and the avoidance of industrial war are of primary importance . . . the representative bodies would concern themselves with such issues as technical training, industrial research and invention, the adoption of improved machinery and processes, and all those matters which are included under scientific management." Soon after the outbreak of the war, the English government entered into an agreement with the trade unions by which trade union rules and customs restrictive of production were suspended for the period of the war. Many of these rules have been confirmed by the test of war as essential safeguards to health and sustained productive efficiency; but many of them were merely the protective covering which the workers had gradually put on in defense against the ruthless exploitation of manufacturers who drove men white when it paid and left them to rot in idleness and hunger when that paid. The most effective device which the workers evolved was ca' canny—deliberate slacking in order to spread the visible demand for labor over as much of the year as possible. It was this fear of unemployment, due largely to cut-throat and feverish competition between employers in the same industry, this terror of slow starvation for themselves and their families that made the skilled workers hostile to the dilution of skilled with unskilled labor, hostile to the introduction of new labor-saving machinery, hostile to the speeding-up processes of scientific management. They were suspicious of the technical schools because these were so frequently used to flood the market with unorganized skilled workers, thus depressing wages and crowding the older men out of their jobs. As in the case of our American colleges, the ethics of technical schools, financed by employers and out of touch with the problems of organized labor, tended to glorify the "scab" as a hero. They were especially hostile to scientific management because in England as in America, scientific managers have been employed to break

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down trade union restrictions without giving the men any other defense against exploitation.

Haggling of this sort, which obstructs the introduction of science into industry, is like a nation-wide pestilence. Under existing conditions it can be ended in two ways only—autocratically, as in Germany, or, as the British Reconstruction Committee proposes, through the acceptance by employers of the principle of democratic control over the conditions of employment.

The problems confronting British industry are essentially the same as the problems confronting industry in America. If, as seems probable, we shall have to solve them along similar lines, it behooves us to make haste if the end of the war is not to find us dangerously handicapped. England has the advantage of a riper industrial experience; her problem is not complicated by a mesh of conflicting state jurisdictions; her industrial population is more homogeneous than ours; it has been easier for her than it will be for us to grasp the idea of national service. Through the traditional recognition which her ministers have accorded to the legislative program of the Trades Union Congress and the presence of a labor group in Parliament, she has been accustomed to think of labor as an estate of the realm entitled to a voice in the formulation of public policy.

But her greatest advantage lies in the maturer intellectual attitude of her business men, statesmen and publicists toward novel ideas. British impermeability to ideas is a stock British joke; but we are so set in our complacency that we have never learned to laugh at ourselves. We are still the most efficient, the most daring, the most inventive business people in the world. Like Mark Twain's Connecticut Yankee we are always certain that the joke is on the other fellow. While we shriek pro-Germanism and malicious anarchy at the I. W. W., syndicalism in England, as in France, has attained the dignity of a philosophy of politics in industry. Mr. Hobson writes of the "rapid ferment of Guild Socialism"—a term practically unheard of by American newspaper readers. And yet the proposals of the British Reconstruction Committee are clearly a conscious compromise between the traditional trade-unionism and industrial individualism of England and the program of the Guild Socialists. The Syndicalists demand the overthrow of the state and the complete ownership of industry by the workers. The Guild Socialists reject syndicalism as they reject the bureaucracy of the State Socialists. Guild Socialism means "the regimentation into a single fellowship of all those who are employed in any given industry." The Guilds would have sole management of the affairs of their industries; they would appoint their own officers from the general manager to the office boy. But they would accept the co-management of the state "in regard to large policy, for the simple reason that the policy of a guild is a public matter, about which the public, as represented by the state, has an indefeasible right to be consulted and considered." The proposal of the Reconstruction Committee differs from the proposal of the Guild Socialists in the fundamental respect that it leaves the capitalist in possession of his capital, it retains the wage system and leaves to the employer exclusive jurisdiction over all problems of management except those which directly affect the conditions of employment inside the factory. But it is such a long step toward Guild Socialism that it fully justifies Mr. Hobson's characterization as "an almost revolutionary advance in the status of labor."

We have profited from England's experience in the mobilization of her resources for war; might it not be well for us to follow her example in creating a Committee on Reconstruction as a measure of preparedness for the economic war that must inevitably follow the war?

Some Achievements of the Original Shipping Board

DEMOCRACY demands results. If results are not forthcoming democratic public opinion has little patience with explanations. If our generals do not win victories we are impatient, and very soon insist upon new generals. Quite possibly the fault lies with conditions for which the generals are not responsible. Our levies may be raw and undisciplined, our equipment antiquated, our munitions inadequate or defective. No matter: we want victories. Inevitably this habit of democracy of basing judgment upon results must often wreak grave injustice upon individuals. This is a condition, however, to which everyone subscribes when he accepts the honor and privileges of leadership.

The New Republic has joined in the criticism of the original Shipping Board on the ground of its failure to achieve patent results in the regulative, as contrasted with the construction part of its task. The chief points of our criticism were that the reorganized board apparently is to take up de novo the problems of priority in the employment of our existing tonnage, of controlling ocean rates, of the relation of our shipping to that of our allies and of the neutrals. The apparent consequence, we indicated, is that we have no such coördination of service, no such economy in the employment of our shipping facilities as in the analogous field of railway transportation.

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It is, however, asserted by persons who are in the best position to appreciate the work of the original board, that this is to ignore the difficulties under which the board labored and to disregard much important work actually done and other important work in process which may or may not have been left in such shape that the reorganized board could take it over. These points are worth careful attention. Any record of positive achievement in the public service is worth detailed consideration. Furthermore, an examination of the conditions under which so important a service as the control of shipping actually operates cannot fail to throw some light upon our general governmental problem in wartime.

With regard to the more rapid progress toward coördination in the national interest on the part of the railways, it must be admitted that while the railways, measured in invested capital or in persons employed, represent a vastly greater interest, and in their technical aspects a vastly more complicated enterprise, they have been subjected to public regulation for decades, and partly under the menace of hostile legislation, have been driven to a degree of coöperation unknown in ocean shipping. The ocean is the native field of unregulated individualism. In default of compelling legislation the ocean carriers could not so quickly be drawn into an organization coöperating with the government as were the railways. And the legislation was slow in coming. The Shipping Board had power to regulate coastwise rates, but not until July 11th, thirteen days before the majority of the old board resigned, was the power conferred upon the President to commandeer high seas shipping and thus actually to control the disposition of tonnage and through control of charters, to control rates.

Ocean transportation is further complicated by its highly international character. American shipping must be disposed with due regard to its relation to Allied and neutral shipping. The American interest in ocean rates does not end with those imposed upon American shipping, but extends to those imposed by neutral and Allied shipping as well, over which the American board can exert only an indirect influence. Upon Allied shipping, influence can be exerted only through negotiation, supplemented in some cases, perhaps, by control of exports under the Embargo provision, or, still more subtly, by international financing arrangements. To neutral shipping the added pressure of control of bunker coal by our British allies and ourselves can be applied. It goes without saying that a vast deal of detailed and delicate negotiation had to be carried on by the Shipping Board, through its chairman, in conjunction with the departments of State and perhaps the Treasury. While we are making common cause with our allies in the world enterprise of defeating the Central Powers, it would be idle to suppose that in such matters as the distribution of shipping and the fixing of rates important differences of interest do not crop out. And in the case of neutrals conflict of interest is of the essence of the situation. We want low rates, but the neutrals want the highest rates possible. We want the neutrals to aid in the North Atlantic carrying trade. They want to keep their shipping safe. The problem in the case of the neutrals is to make them perform at fair rates the customary duties of common carriers by which they thrive in time of peace without imposing upon them burdens and restrictions justified only by the law of superior might.

How far the Shipping Board had made progress toward a solution of this international complex is known only to those whose lips are diplomatically sealed. No agreement had been reached when the board was reorganized, nor need we anticipate the early conclusion of such an agreement. If it be true, as has been asserted, that the board all but had its hands upon a satisfactory arrangement with the Allies, we may have lost valuable time through the board's reorganization. This consideration we may let pass, in view of the impossibility of attaining to certainty. So much, however, may safely be said in the board's behalf: at least it exposed the problem in all its complexities and in so far contributed to its final solution.

Suppose that the board under Mr. Denman had succeeded in establishing its control over rates, what was it prepared to do? Had it an intelligible scheme of priority shipments? We are given to understand that the key upon which the board was working, in other trades than the North Atlantic, was the provision of sufficient tonnage for inbound shipments of necessities, as for example, jute from the East; manganese, Chili saltpeter and other necessary materials from South America. Outbound shipments would be limited to cargo space determined by necessary inbound shipments. Had the board anything like schedules of rates, or at least a working principle? So far as schedules of rates are concerned, it appears that the board had none, nor could this have been expected of it. It could not determine rates without hearings, and until July 11th it had no power to assemble ship owners for the purpose of rate hearings. So far as a working principle is concerned, the board is said to have accepted tentatively something of the following nature: For shipments to our allies freights should correspond to cost, including a fair profit. For shipments to Latin America, the same. For inbound shipments, the cost principle wherever it might be clear that the benefit of the cost rate re-

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dounded to the government or to the consuming public, but the principle of what the traffic will bear when the benefit of the low rate would be intercepted by private business concerns. In the latter case, ocean transportation would yield a profit, to be covered into the public treasury.

Whether such a principle could practically be embodied in a schedule of ocean rates may remain an open question. Its democratic quality and its harmony with the general principles of price regulation in war toward which our government is making progress are sufficiently obvious.

The weakest point in our general war administration is the failure to solve the labor question satisfactorily. The Shipping Board has an important labor problem to deal with in the employment of men on shipboard. Since the enactment of the Seamen's law the old state of quasi-serfdom on American ships has passed into history. But there remain the ordinary problems of labor: wages and conditions of employment, unionization versus the open shop, etc. Under the auspices of Mr. Denman and the board, representatives of the seamen and of the more important shipping companies met in a series of conferences in May and June and effected a comprehensive agreement covering wages and bonuses for those who should be employed on ships crossing the submarine zone. The companies and men also entered into an agreement determining the proportion of boys who should be employed about the ships, and regulating the character of training to be given them, with a view to supplying the national need for able seamen. Under this agreement, for the first time in American history labor on the sea is more democratically organized than in most industries on the land. In this connection should also be mentioned the organization of schools for the training of officers for the merchant marine.

To all these activities of the board we must add the work of presenting before the committees of Congress the claims of the board for the additional legislative powers required by wartime conditions, and for financial grants, more especially for the Emergency Shipbuilding Corporation organized under the board.

What stands out clearly in this summary is the anomaly involved in attempting to execute such functions through the agency of an administrative board. Such boards are most successful where their duties are confined to the practical application of determined policies. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, do not make policies, but apply them. Policy-making, in so far as it is not undertaken by Congress, falls within the province of the President and Cabinet. It is obvious that much of the work of the Shipping Board bore the character of policy-making rather than routine administration. This is clearly the case with the elaboration of projects of laws, the conducting of negotiations with representatives of foreign Powers. It is also the case with the distribution of shipping. Whether we should reduce to the minimum tonnage employed in the Oriental trade, whether we should further limit or increase our facilities for trading with Latin-America, are essentially matters of national policy. The Departments of State, of Commerce, of the Treasury, ought to have something to say about them. In countries having a flexible cabinet, all such activities would be assigned to a cabinet post created for the purpose. In this country the concentration of responsibility takes place without formal intention. In the nature of the case the chairman of the Shipping Board must be something more than a chairman. As an administrative body the board must be expected to suffer from this diversion of its leadership to purposes reaching into the field of policy-making. Policies entail conflict of interests and constant risk of interrupted continuity. Where Cabinet organization is flexible, the changes in Cabinet personnel are kaleidoscopic—and non-invidious—but the subjoined administrative services go on uninterruptedly. We must assume that the President's action in changing the personnel of the Shipping Board was based upon adequate reasons of policy. This fact should not be regarded as reflecting unfavorably in any way upon the original personnel. And unfortunately we can not settle down to the confident belief that now our shipping enterprises will all run smoothly. The political and the administrative functions of the board remain confused. The technical shipping experience essential to the greatest efficiency in the board's purely administrative activities remains underrepresented in its personnel.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1917, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

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YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE: REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

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The Essentials of Peace

THE international situation at the present time is beyond question the most wonderful that the world has ever seen. There is not a country in which the great majority of sensible people is not passionately desirous of peace, of an enduring peace, and—the war goes on. The conditions of peace can now be stated in general terms that are as acceptable to a reasonable man in Berlin as they are to a reasonable man in Paris or London or Petrograd or Constantinople. There are to be no conquests, no domination of recalcitrant populations, no bitter insistence upon vindictive penalties, and there must be something in the nature of a world-wide League of Nations to keep the peace securely in future, to "make the world safe for democracy," and maintain international justice. To that the general mind of the world has come to-day.

Why then does the waste and killing go on? Why is not the Peace Conference sitting now?

Manifestly because a small minority of people in positions of peculiar advantage, in positions of trust and authority, prevent or delay its assembling.

The answer which seems to suffice in all the Allied countries is that the German Imperial government, that the German Imperial government alone, stands in the way, that its tradition is incurably a tradition of conquest and aggression, that until German militarism is overthrown, etc. Few people in the Allied countries will dispute that that is broadly true. But is it the whole and complete truth? Is there nothing more to be done on our side? Let us put a question that goes to the very heart of the problem. Why does the great mass of the German people still cling to its incurably belligerent government?

The answer to that question is not overwhelmingly difficult. The German people sticks to its militarist imperialism as Mazeppa stuck to his horse; because it is bound to it and the wolves pursue. The attentive student of the home and foreign propaganda literature of the German government will realize that the case made by German imperialism, the main argument by which it sticks to power is this, that the Allied governments are also imperialist, that they also aim at conquest and aggression, that for Germany the choice is world empire or downfall and utter ruin. This is the argument that holds the German people stiffly united. For most men in most countries it would be a convincing argument, strong enough to override considerations of right and wrong. I find that I myself am of this way of thinking, that whether England has done right or wrong in the past—and I have sometimes criticized my country very bitterly—I will not endure the prospect of seeing her at the foot of some victorious foreign nation. Neither will any German who matters. Very few people would respect a German who would.

But the case for the Allies is that this great argument by which, and by which alone, the German Imperial government keeps its grip upon the German people at the present time and keeps them facing their enemies, is untrue. The Allies declare that they do not want to destroy the German people, they do not want to cripple the German people; they want merely to see certain gaping wounds inflicted by Germany repaired, and beyond that reasonable requirement they want nothing but to be assured, completely assured, absolutely assured, against any further aggressions on the part of Germany.

Is that true? Our leaders say so and we believe them. And if it is true have the statesmen of the Allies made it as transparently and convincingly clear to the German people as possible? That is one of the supreme questions of the present time. We cannot too earnestly examine it. Because in the answer to it lies the reason why so many men were killed yesterday on the eastern and western fronts, so many ships sunk, so much property destroyed, so much human energy wasted for ever upon mere destruction, and why tomorrow and the next day and the day after—through many months yet perhaps—the same killing and destroying must still go on.

In many respects this war has been an amazing display of human inadaptability. The military history of the war has still to be written, the grim story of machinery misunderstood, improvements resisted, antiquated methods persisted in, but the broad facts are already before the public mind. After three years of war the air offensive, which is the only possible decisive blow to strike, is still merely talked of. And at least equally remarkable is the dragging inadaptability of European statescraft. Everywhere the failure of ministers and statesmen to rise to the urgent definite necessities of the present time is glaringly conspicuous. They seem to be incapable even of thinking how the war may be brought to an end. They seem incapable of that plain speaking to the world audience which alone can bring about a peace. They keep on with the tricks and feints of a departed age, with bureau politics. Both on the side of the Allies and on the

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side of the Germans the declarations of public policy remain childishly vague and disingenuous, childishly "diplomatic." They chaffer while civilization bleeds to death. It was perhaps to be expected. Few, if any, men of over five and forty completely readjust themselves to changed conditions, however novel and challenging the changes may be, and nearly all the leading figures in these affairs are elderly men, not only trained in a tradition of diplomatic ineffectiveness, but overworked and overstrained to a pitch of complete inelasticity. They go on as if it were still 1913. Could anything be more palpably shifty and unsatisfactory, more senile, more feebly artful, than the recent utterances of the German Chancellor? And, on our own side—

Let us examine the three leading points about this peace business in which this jaded statescraft is most apparent.

Let the reader ask himself the following questions:

Does he know what the Allies mean to do with the problem of Central Africa? It is the clear common sense of the African situation that while these precious regions of raw material remain divided up between a number of competitive European imperialisms, each resolutely set upon the exploitation of its "possessions" to its own advantage and the disadvantage of the others, there can be no permanent peace in the world. It is impossible. There can be permanent peace in the world only when tropical and sub-tropical Africa constitute a field free to the commercial enterprise of everyone, irrespective of nationality, when this is no longer an area of competition between nations. This is possible only under some supreme international control, a control in which each nation interested can exercise a share corresponding to its original possessions. It requires no special knowledge nor wisdom to see that. A schoolboy can see it. Anyone but a statesman absolutely flaccid with overstrain can see that. However difficult it may prove to work out in detail such an international control *must* therefore be worked out. The manifest solution of the problem of the German colonies in Africa is neither to return them to her nor deprive her of them but to give her a share in the pooled general control of mid-Africa. So she can be deprived of all power for political mischief in Africa without humiliation or economic injury. So, too, we can head off—and in no other way can we head off—the power for evil, the power of developing quarrels, inherent in "imperialism" other than German.

But has the reader any assurance that this sane solution of the African problem has the support of the Allied governments? At best he has only a vague persuasion. And consider how the matter looks "over there." The German government assures the German people that the Allies intend to cut off Germany from the African supply of raw material. That would mean the practical destruction of German economic life. It is something far more vital to the mass of Germany than any question of Belgium or Alsace-Lorraine. It is one of the ideas most potent in nerving the overstrained German people to continue their fight. Why are we, and why are the German people, not given some definite assurance in this matter? Given reparation in Europe, is Germany to be allowed a fair share in the control and trade of a pooled and neutralized Central Africa? Sooner or later we must come to some such arrangement. Why not state it plainly now?

A second question is equally essential to any really permanent settlement and it is one upon which these eloquent but unsatisfactory mouthpieces of ours turn their backs with an equal resolution, and that is the fate of the Ottoman Empire. What in plain English are we up to there? Whatever happens, that Humpty Dumpty cannot be put back as it was before the war. The idea of the German imperialist, the idea of our own little band of noisy but influential imperialist vulgarians, is evidently a game of grab, a perilous cutting up of these areas into jostling protectorates, and spheres of influence, from which either the Germans or the Allies (according to the side you are on) are to be viciously shut out. On such a basis this war is a war to the death. Neither Germany, France, Britain, Italy or Russia can live prosperously if its trade and enterprise are shut out from this cardinally important area. There is therefore no alternative, if we are to have a satisfactory permanent pacification of the world, but local self-development in these regions under honestly conceived international control of police and transit and trade. Let it be granted that that will be a difficult control to organize; none the less it has to be attempted. It has to be attempted because *there is no other way of peace.* But once that conception has been clearly formulated a second great motive why Germany should continue fighting will have gone.

The third great issue about which there is nothing but fog and uncertainty is the so-called "War after the War," the idea of a permanent economic alliance to prevent the economic recuperation of Germany. Upon that idea German imperialism in its frantic efforts to keep its people fighting, naturally puts the utmost stress. The threat of a War after the War robs the reasonable German of his last inducement to make peace. Shut out from all trade, unable to buy food, deprived of raw material, peace would be as bad for Germany as war. He will argue naturally enough and reasonably

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enough that he may as well die fighting as starve. This is a far more vital issue to him than the Belgian issue or Poland or Alsace-Lorraine. Our statesmen waste their breath and slight our intelligence when these foreground questions are thrust in front of the really fundamental matters. But as the mass of sensible people in every country concerned, in Germany just as much as in France or Great Britain, know perfectly well, unimpeded trade is good for everyone except a few rich adventurers, and restricted trade destroys limitless wealth and welfare for mankind to make a few private fortunes or secure an advantage for some imperialist clique. We want an end to this economic strategy, we want an end to this plotting of governments against the welfare of their neighbors. In such offenses Germany has been the chief of sinners, but which among the belligerent nations can throw the first stone? Here again the way to the world's peace, the only way to enduring peace, lies through internationalism, through an international survey of commercial treaties, through an international control of interstate shipping and transport rates. Unless the Allied statesmen fail to understand the implications of their own general professions they mean that. But why do they not say it plainly? Why do they not shout it so compactly and loudly that all Germany will hear and understand. Why do they justify imperialism to Germany? Why do they maintain a threatening ambiguity towards Germany on all these matters?

By doing so they leave Germany no choice but a war of desperation. They underline and endorse the claim of German imperialism that this is war for bare existence. They unify the German people. They prolong the war.

H. G. WELLS.

London.

Conscription of Thought

SOCIAL psychologists, notably Mr. Trotter in his account of herd psychology, have described the peculiar mental effect of war upon the civilian population. Vague unlocalized anxiety and fear; dread of isolation, and desire for company to reinforce confidence and opinion; quick and easy accessibility to rumor, indeed, an eager hospitality to it; extreme credulity as to both good news and bad; a suspicious attitude which finds spies and enemies everywhere; scandalmongering of pessimistic inventions as to incompetency in high places and disloyalty in all places—these are some of the observed facts of mass-psychology in times of great emotional stir when the issue hangs in abeyance. There is no need to reduce the variety of manifestations to any single principle. But running through them all is a demand for solidarity in order to prosecute war, combined with an emotional instability in the face of the shifting panorama of success and failure, an instability which is continually eating into solidarity.

We have not suffered as yet in this country from a bad attack of war nerves; the scene is too remote. On a small scale, however, practically all of the phenomena of Europe in the first year of the war have been duplicated. The most striking effect up to the present has been a morbid sensitiveness at any exhibition of diversity of opinion. One of the accompaniments of abnormal emotional states is likely to be an extraordinary sense of mental lucidity. The more irrational the condition, the greater the attendant sense of self-possessed rationality. So it is with us at present. Our reactions to dissent and criticism are mainly reactions of irritation, due to the hypersensitiveness of nerves on edge. But we justify our attacks and suppressions on the rational ground that social cohesion is a necessity, and that we are simply taking measures to secure union. That this rationalization is a piece of self-inflicted camouflage appears as soon as we call to mind the lessons of experience regarding the inefficiency of all prior attempts to dragoon thought and feeling.

I am not questioning the importance of social solidarity, of union of action, in war times. As with the soldier, so with the civil population there is demand for closed ranks, for mass formations, for lining up with eyes right, and forward by platoons. Some surrenders and abandonments of the liberties of peace time are inevitable. Men pay more for flour and beefsteak whether they like it or not; and at countless social points they have to ask themselves whether they will make a sacrifice willingly from sense of union with their fellows, or sourly, peevishly, disgruntledly, in a sense of superior isolation. Moreover, the needed cohesion in action is best attained along with intellectual and emotional unity. Without a certain sweep of undivided beliefs and sentiments unity of outer action is likely to be mechanical and simulated. What is denied is the efficacy of force to remove disunion of thought and feeling.

There is something strange in the history of toleration. Almost all men have learned the lesson of toleration with respect to past heresies and divisions. We wonder how men ever grew so hard

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and cruel about differences of opinion and faith. We are perplexed when we read how the heretic was regarded as a man with a plague which would surely spread unless he, the heretic, was extirpated. We reason with philosophic wisdom about the impossibility of conquering mind by brute force, of changing ideas by means of the truncheon or the nightstick. We recall that such attempts at direct suppression of thought have usually ended by increasing the vitality of obnoxious beliefs; we quote the saying that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church. We are surprised that leaders had not enough common sense to allow unpopular ideas to burn themselves out or die of inanition. But when some affair of our own day demands cohesive action and stirs deep feeling, we at once dignify the unpopular cause with persecution; we feed its flame with our excited suspicions; we make it the center of a factitious attention, and lend it importance by the conspicuousness of our efforts at suppression.

There is probably no one in the country who was not aware that many persons among us were pro-German in their sympathies; that there were others who were opposed to all war, and yet others with whom this war was unpopular, and others who centered their hostility upon the policy of conscription. These are facts well known to everyone. There is no evidence that their influence is great enough to hamper success in carrying on the war. There is the regular machinery of law, somewhat sharpened in any case by recourse to the "war-power," for taking care of those whose lack of intellectual and emotional sympathy carries them into any overt attack upon law or the government. It is not judgment, it is uneasy emotion troubled by its own lack of direct outlet in action, which clothes simple facts with dreadful and hidden import, which finds latent treason in German type, and power to paralyze the military arm in a conference of Greenwich Village pacifists or socialists. Then comes the resort to the "secular arm," to the machinery of administrative action, to the pressure of organized public agitation. And these for us operate not to persuade the dissentients, but to gag them; not to develop union, but to force disunion out of sight where it will breed and fester; not to render division innocuous by humor and polite indifference, but to manufacture importance and create significance. It is of course a proper part of the technique of those at whom the attempted conscription of mind is directed to profess a shocked horror, a resentful surprise. But unless they are as lacking in sense as those who have zeal without knowledge, they must utter their protestations with their tongues in their cheeks, and pray God daily that their enemies will again come to their rescue and scatter abroad their propaganda as left to themselves they could never succeed in doing.

I am not, then, specially concerned lest liberty of thought and speech seriously suffer among us, certainly not in any lasting way. The fight was carried on against so much greater odds in the past and still made its way, so that I cannot arouse any genuine distress on this score. Indeed, there is something rather funny in the spectacle of ultra-socialists rallying to the old banner of Elihu Root with its inscription of the sanctity of individual rights and constitutional guaranties, and crying aloud all the early Victorian political platitudes. What I am concerned with is rather the historically demonstrated inefficacy of the conscription of mind as a means of promoting social solidarity, and the gratuitous stupidity of measures that defeat their own ends. Yet there is a way in which these things do undermine freedom of thought:—not the freedom of those who are attacked, but of those who do the attacking or who sympathize, even passively, with the attack. Absence of thought, apathy of intelligence, is the chief enemy to freedom of mind. And these hasty ill considered attempts to repress discussion of unpopular ideas and criticisms of governmental action foster general intellectual inertness. The sensation of activity caused by excited emotion gives an illusion of mental acuteness and alertness; the energy required for serious thinking is drafted off in superficial channels of suspicion and hostility.

Now our American effective participation in the war is much more likely to be hampered by lack of those ideas which can spring only from discussion, only from spread of knowledge and enlightenment of belief, than by indulgence of small groups and cults in free display of their sacred party emblems and religious passwords, no matter how obnoxious the latter are to the great majority. For the ultimate American participation should consist not in money nor in men, but in the final determination of peace policies which is made possible by the contribution of men and money. There is a tendency to extend the wished-for conscription of ideas from out and out "stop-the-war" discussions, to all those who desire a general discussion of American war aims and peace policies. There is evident fear lest such discussion divert energy from the immediate task of carrying on war vigorously;—as though those who are not actually fighting would spend all their working hours in paying income taxes and economizing on food if they only refrained from thinking and talking about America's real interest in the war and how that interest is to be defined and made effective in detail. Here, I repeat, is the real danger in that

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policy of "Hush, don't think, only feel and act" to which every forward step in the conscription of thought commits us. There is not a tithe of the danger to our effective participation in the war from those who think wildly and erratically that there is from those who do not think enough. Even if the President is prepared to come forward at the right time with the wisest of all possible peace measures, we shall have missed the greatest contribution which the war has to make to our future national integrity, if these measures come before a people intellectually unprepared and apathetic. We shall then have the physical fact of peace whatever it may be, but not its meaning. We shall have taken a step forward in overcoming a physical and territorial isolation from the world, but shall remain as provincially separate as before in thought and interest. Above all we shall have missed the great experience of discovering the significance of American national life by seeing it reflected into a remaking of the life of the world. And without this experience we shall miss the contribution which the war has to make to the creation of a united America.

JOHN DEWEY.

Representative Government in British Industry

THE reception accorded in Great Britain by the business world to the proposal to establish in each organized industry a national council representative of employers and employed, for "the regular consideration of matters affecting the progress and wellbeing of the trade," is as noteworthy as the proposal itself. All classes appear to be willing and even anxious to apply the principle of representative self-government not only to the conduct of the great trades but to their constituent businesses. The Whitley report, adopted by the Reconstruction Committee of the Cabinet, proposes not only a Joint Standing Industrial Council for each great national industry but District Councils and Works Committees within each business, upon which capital and labor shall be equally represented. While the particular functions of these representative bodies would vary with the varying conditions of each industry, the general scope accorded to them is very wide. They are not to be mere substitutes for and extensions of the Conciliation Boards already existing in a good many trades. For though the settlement of differences between capital and labor and the avoidance of industrial war are of primary importance, the encouragement of positive coöperation for industrial progress is not less desirable, if the future of our industry is to be confronted with any confidence. While, therefore, questions of standard wages, hours, overtime, apprenticeship, shop discipline, and other questions immediately affecting labor would fall within this scope, the representative bodies would also concern themselves with such issues as technical training, industrial research and invention, the adoption of improved machinery and processes, and all those matters which are included under "scientific management." Questions of finance, the determination of lines of production, the buying and selling processes, would presumably remain, as hitherto, an exclusive domain for the management, though it will require experience to determine the margin between the matters included in the coöperative sphere and those that are excluded.

If carried into effect, the proposals will mark an almost revolutionary advance in the status of labor. Not merely do they place on a permanent authoritative basis the timid, tentative, and precarious machinery of conciliation, but they accord to labor a definite claim to an equal control with capital over all matters affecting their common interest. It is true that it is not at present proposed to give any legal recognition to this new machinery of economic government, or any legal enforcement of its decisions. The State, in fact, is not to interfere, except so far as to offer advice and supply information where requested. But custom and public opinion may be expected to furnish powerful sanctions for the fulfilment of agreements entered into by the representative bodies. If the national industrial councils register judgments on questions of wages, hours, etc., it may reasonably be expected that they will soon become the effective legislature of the industry. For the silent pressure upon employers who may have stood outside the association, and upon workers who were not members of their union, will be powerful and continuous. If they continue to stand out, they will simply have no voice in determining the conditions to which in point of fact they will find themselves compelled to conform. If indeed, as it is not unlikely, the national council should of their own accord come to the government to ask for powers to make their decisions enforcible throughout the trade, so as to defeat the machinations of a recalcitrant minority either of employers or of workers, public opinion would certainly support a claim which made for more efficient organization.

To those who know how bitterly antagonistic capital and labor were before the war, and what smouldering hostility has been gathering in wartime, it may be a matter of surprise that important employers and labor leaders in the engineering, mining, and other trades should have as-

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sented so readily to these proposals for industrial harmony and coöperation. But deeper reflection enables us to understand that, having in view the grave economic situation which must emerge from the war crisis, there is no alternative save violent revolution to the radical reconstruction here sketched out. Revolution is a big word and we are often reminded that the Briton is not a revolutionary animal either in his politics or his economics. But sober, well informed men in every walk of life are speculating on the possibility, even probability, of an upheaval to which no other term is applicable. Nobody here thought that war was more than a small possibility three years ago, and the shock of their lesson has seriously affected their judgment upon internal events. Every thoughtful person knows that the business disturbances involved in struggling back to a peace basis in a shattered and disintegrated world, the difficulties of supplying foods and materials, the continuance of high prices and the burden of war taxation carried on to years of peace, must strain to the utmost the productive powers of the nation. Industrial peace, in a word, depends upon high productivity, and high productivity depends in turn upon industrial peace. It is the perception of this truth which prevails upon the employing and propertied classes to bring them into a scheme making concessions to labor which to many of them would have appeared dangerous and unnecessary ten years ago. They are well aware that labor will nowhere consent to settle down on pre-war conditions of submissiveness. The high standard of real and money wages, secured during wartime by the pressure of the scarcity of labor, must somehow be retained in peace time when the scarcity has gone. It will be quite impracticable to propose a reduction of wages in any of the staple well organized trades. Among the civilian workers during the war there has everywhere been a quickening of resolution for a conscious organized program in which adequate wages, security of employment, and a direct share in the control of their industry and business are the outstanding items. In many strata of the non-working classes some similar quickening in the sense of social justice behind these demands has come to their support, and I find even among the ranks of employers a considerable body of quite genuine willingness to make the large new concessions involved in the proposals of industrial democracy.

Indeed, what active criticism arises is chiefly found among the socialist workers. It is partly the product of a general suspicion of all proposals put out by a capitalist government and received favorably by a capitalist press. Partly it is due to the rapid ferment of a Syndicalism, or a Guild Socialism, which dreams of an early and complete conquest of each industry by the workers in that industry, and a consequent conviction that peaceful coöperation between capital and labor is a foolish and an enervating process. How strong this feeling in favor of direct revolutionary action is nobody can tell. Certainly it is unlikely to command the majority of the rank and file of the strong trade unions, who are men likely to recognize in the national industrial councils and the workshops committees fields for successful trade union advance.

The scheme, however, must not in any case be regarded as a panacea for industrial troubles. It furnishes machinery for harmonious relations between capital and labor, but its working must depend upon the intelligence, goodwill, and mutual confidence put into it by the two parties. Probably those who have devised it are not unaware of its limitations. It furnishes no new or final principle for the distribution of the wealth produced between the capital and labor which have coöperated in producing it. In a competitive system of industry it may serve well to secure minimum standard wages and the equally necessary interest in invested capital. But one certain and early result of the experiment will be the formation of syndicates or cartels, mitigating or suspending competition between the several businesses and concerting common measures for output and the regulation of selling prices, with a view to maintaining a prosperous condition of trade. Even if not supported by a tariff upon foreign competition, some of the national trades will be so strongly entrenched in the home market as to be able to control output and prices. This result of organization must open up two difficulties. In the first place, the new machinery contains no real principle for apportioning in high wages and high profits the surplus gains which such successful combination would furnish. When the ordinary haggling of the market qualified by the weapons of the strike or lockout is suspended, there remain no rules for settling what shall be the share of either party to the bargain. Some rough and ready division of the spoils may be devised, but there is no real law of harmony or equity to say how much labor should get and how much capital.

Another result of this same combinatory process is that the competition which has disappeared among the members of the industry may reappear upon the larger scale of a struggle between the national industries themselves. If coal-mining is governed by a national council, representative of its capital and labor, what is there to prevent the emergence of a joint-profiteering scheme in which high wages and high profits are secured by charging on other industries and private consumers all that the trade will bear? In other words, excellent as the scheme is for experimentation in industrial

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peace in the several trades, it remains a trade individualism. There is perhaps no harm in passing through this process. It seems in fact to be the next necessary step in the evolution towards a new social-economic order. But there is no finality in it, and it is as well that those who enter into it should recognize that fact. The state interference that they reject at present will have to come in later on for the protection of industry as a whole and of the consuming public against the oppression of a government that only represents producers.

One final word upon the limits of the experiment. It is only intended to apply to industries which are already highly organized, both on the side of employers and employed. Other proposals are being devised for dealing with unorganized and feebly organized trades, taking shape in an extension of the Trade Boards act, by which, in certain sweated trades, committees representative of capital and labor, with other persons appointed by the Board of Trade, have been empowered to make standard minimum rates of pay legally enforcible upon the entire trade. It is suggested that some such machinery shall be applied to all unorganized trades, but with powers to deal with hours and other labor conditions as well as wages. Thus the problem of building up a new industrial order on a basis of pacific settlement of the claims of capital and labor is likely to be tackled both at the top and at the bottom of the industrial system, if these proposals are adopted by the government and the business world.

J. A. Hobson.

Women Farm Workers

WHEN the newspapers were photographing "farmerettes," and the department stores advertised a strange garment called "womanalls," New York had a vague proud feeling that something was really being done about the agricultural situation. Male laborers might be drafted, but patriotic city women were already taking their places, eagerly welcomed, of course, by the grateful farmers. But when the Mayor's Committee of Women on National Defense, of New York City, began to investigate, it found that the facts were far different. There were, it is true, a few women in New York City desirous of doing agricultural work, but there were apparently no farmers willing to hire women workers, nor, if they were forced to have them, did they know how they could manage to house and care for this sort of helpers. The Committee, then, sought and found a plan to meet the situation and is experimenting with it this summer, with the idea of trying to get it widely adopted next year should it prove successful.

To begin with, the Committee discovered that there was no employment bureau in New York to handle women farm workers. With the advice of the Federation of Non-Commercial Employment Bureaus and under the direction of the Employment Bureau of the New York State Industrial Commission, the Mayor's Committee of Women on National Defense opened an office to handle this sort of placement work for New York City. On getting into communication with the County Farm Bureau Agents up the state the Committee found that many farmers were seeking women, but all wanted them to do housework, not outside work. The burden of feeding extra farm laborers naturally made domestic help for the farmer's wife an imperative need. On the other hand, of all the women who came to the Committee's office to register, not a single one could be persuaded to do housework in a farmer's family. This seemed to be a hopeless deadlock; but two experiments begun early in the season pointed the way to a possible solution of the difficulty. This is the so-called unit plan for agricultural workers.

The essence of the unit plan is that the women workers live in a community, under a captain or supervisor, with a system of coöperative housekeeping, and go out from this centre in squads to work on neighboring farms or estates. This relieves the farmer's wife of the burden of feeding the extra laborers; and though you cannot persuade women to go and help cook in the farmer's kitchen you can, oddly enough—or perhaps naturally enough—secure women who will go as a "dietitian" or cook with one of these units, to be a member of the community in full and important standing, in charge of the catering and cooking.

The first of these units to be organized was begun through the energy and ability of a public-spirited woman in Westchester County. She secured the loan of an old, unoccupied farm house, raised some capital to back the enterprise, and sought women to join an "agricultural training camp." A number of working girls who were graduates of the Manhattan Trade School were enlisted, and also a large group of Barnard College students and alumnæ, three students from the Department of Household Arts at Teachers College to serve as dietitians, an agricultural expert to coach the girls, and a professor of geology from Barnard who volunteered to act as director of the camp. Barnard has also provided a bookkeeper and several chauffeurs, and some members have joined the group from other colleges. "The Mount Kisco Unit" now comprises about sixty-five young women.

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The girls are paid by the unit a monthly wage of fifteen dollars a month and their board. The unit is paid by the farmers, who hire the girls, twenty-five cents an hour for each worker, that is, two dollars for an eight-hour day. At these rates it looks as if the unit could be made self-supporting, but until the season is over and the accounts carefully studied no definite conclusion can be reached.

Before being enlisted the girls are examined by a physician to ensure their being in sound health. After their arrival at the camp they generally work for a week or two in the "house garden" under the direction of the agricultural expert. When they are in good training from this, they are sent out in squads to work on the farms and estates in the vicinity. A Ford motor-bus distributes them to their daily tasks and collects them when the day is over. The young women are living, with the simplest sort of equipment, in the spacious old farm house and in tents pitched near by. Some shower baths have been installed, cot beds provided, and a few bits of furniture. The dietitians are giving them excellent and satisfactory food. The whole party appears to be enjoying life thoroughly, a cheerful and healthy community. Attired in blue jean overalls and white blouses, the young agriculturists start out each morning for their assigned tasks. At first the farmers in the neighborhood looked with extreme scepticism upon the women's enterprise. But some of the owners of nearby estates gave the girls a trial and found that they "made good." Now the demand is much greater than the unit can satisfy. The girls are working steadily at all sorts of gardening labor, at hoeing corn, at haying. Physically they are standing it admirably, especially the college students.

This Mount Kisco Unit, conducted under the most favorable conditions, in an agricultural neighborhood closely settled and well adapted to this plan, offers an excellent opportunity for experimenting with the possibilities of women farm workers under the unit system. Many of the girls trained at this admirable camp will be qualified to act next year as captains or supervisors of new units.

Another experiment, in some ways even more interesting and promising than that at Mount Kisco, is a unit of trades-union girls organized under the guidance of the Mayor's Committee and working on a large fruit farm in the great fruit country along the Hudson. This group formed a self-government organization, elected a captain, hired a woman to cook and supervise the household, undertook to pay fifty cents a week apiece toward the common expenses, and started out with a capital of fifty dollars advanced by the Committee to pay their first grocer's bill, and to be repaid later from their earnings. They are living in tents and with equipment supplied by the owner of the fruit farm and are paid at piece rates for their labor at picking berries, "thinning" peaches, and similar tasks. It is expected that their earnings will cover their living expenses and leave them a small balance.

The demand for labor in the fruit-growing district is so great at harvest time that many similar units have been asked for this year and might be placed in future summers. If numerous other groups of working girls from the seasonal trades, thrown out of their regular employment for several months in the summer, could be thus shifted to the country for work on the fruit farms, they would be better off than if left unemployed in New York, and might profit greatly in physical health as well as economically. The Committee is opposed to placing for farm work shop girls with only two weeks' vacation, believing that they need all of this short period for relaxation; but it feels that for women in the trades that have a long slack season the unit plan may hold great possibilities.

As the summer has progressed and the work of the Committee has been advertised, and as the shortage of labor has become more pressing, farmers have been converted from their sceptical unwillingness to try women workers. The demand for units has become greater than the Committee can fill. Ten are now in the field, most of them desiring to enlarge. The Committee has decided not to organize any more at present, but to inspect carefully those already out, keep them filled, and observe their problems and their progress.

So far the experiment has demonstrated anew what has of course been found in England and elsewhere, that healthy women are physically able to do nearly all kinds of farm work. It has shown also that with little or no technical training they can be useful workers at many agricultural tasks. The unit plan of living arrangements seems to offer a happy solution of some of the difficulties of the farmer's wife, following as it does the general tendency to remove work from the home. Besides providing unskilled laborers, the experiment may this year turn the attention of some educated women to the interest and importance of agriculture as a profession and cause them to take it up scientifically, with a view to becoming farm superintendents.

Of course the unit plan is adapted primarily to a rather closely settled country with intensive agriculture. For many sections of the Middle West and South it would not be suitable. Moreover, it should not be undertaken unless adequate machinery is provided for inspecting the places where units are to be sent, for examining the women physically

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before they are enrolled, and for supervising them after they are in the field.

The Committee hopes to profit by its mistakes as well as its successes this year and to draw up in the autumn a careful report summarizing the results of its experiments. Should the facts warrant, it will try to promote the formation of many units next summer. This work might well be undertaken by women's clubs and other organizations in country districts. With the explicit directions regarding housing, equipment, diet, and financial arrangements which the Committee will be able to supply, the task will be comparatively simple. Next year, moreover, the shortage of farm labor will presumably be so acute that every possible effort must be made to meet the deficiency. Perhaps the national and state governments can be persuaded to provide proper machinery, as England has done, for enabling groups of women to migrate temporarily from the cities to the countryside and perform this sort of patriotic service.

VIRGINIA C. GILDERSLEEVE.

Durham Concert

WHEN I go to a concert in Durham I never fail to be impressed with the gravity of the occasion. I am always surrounded by serious gentlemen in evening black, and by ladies who seem to be made up entirely of those who wear frizzled Alexandran fronts and collars of Maltese lace, and of those—younger in years than the solemn Alexandras—who peer through great eye-glasses at their programs and into space; and they all become for me the forms of aspiration. We are to have Beethoven Number 3 and L'Arlésienne and César Franck. My neighbors, then, are about to enter the world of art. They begin to hush their breaths and to take on a look that suggests some kind of sacred ennui, holy boredom, but is in reality a conscious and pleasurable exercise of virtue. Pleasure is not so much my neighbor's object as edification. I begin to think reprovingly of those superficial and foolish races that we associate ordinarily with music. What children they are, they neither reverence nor consider deeply. In some way or other, it is true, they did create most of the music of the world; but only by some sort of childish and lavish gift and accident; what a pity they did not seriously understand. And so, as we descend into the subject, the beautiful body of art fades, its beautiful voice, its heart; we are thinking solemnly of canonized bones. Plainly in this little New England city music is no idle matter.

There are students and professors and cultured bodies everywhere that take the same tone with art as do my concert neighbors. They would have you enter that art as a definite region, not to be rushed into with harsh footsteps, it is for them a place of initiation and awe. They insist that in art there is some sort of added surface, something of a second nature to be laid on. They have a feeling of holy austerity about it all, of duty and ardor, of special mission and pious labor. They have a kind of grave reproof for those who also love art but without solemnity.

But this is a sure sign of the outsider, of the layman's creed. It is as when an Anglo-Saxon sets up as poetic an Italian who is at once the most passionate and practical of men; the more he romanticizes his man the further he is outside the Italian temperament. It is one of those ways of professionalizing, of setting up functions for things, that show the outsider. I call to mind the actor of the moving picture film of Christus, who went through it all in one key, that of the man thoughtful and humble in exactly the same way for thirty years—the actor's conception of the redeemer, the redeemer professionalized. Such a mien suited very well the brooding child, but it left one wondering why people should follow as they did later so remotely monotonous a man over hills and through the streets. This was outside the rôle certainly, for Jesus must have been, of all things, human; and the human—and art as well—is precisely as important as it is flexible, as it is able at once to depart from itself and yet remain itself. This professionalizing never ends. So may we hear the earnest lecturer rebuke all dancing in America while the soldiers are in the Belgian trenches, though the soldiers themselves are singing and disporting themselves with the joy of life in them. So we hear of the dreaming musician's soul at his twilight window, though his concerto came to him as he ground his coffee mill. And so the story of the sacred lyrics written on sherry and onions will never, never do. So with the outsider, but no artist out of books and Chautauquas ever felt in this fashion. He may be led to pose a little, to talk of his work as a hard necessity and laying-on of Fate's hand, a holy light and profound purpose; but he is no artist if he means it, only an earnest soul struggling with spiritual platitudes. The holiness business makes better lectures and memorials than it does art. A bigger thing has him in hand; your real artist knows that his art is the one thing that gives him relief for what is stirring in him; it may be his destruction but it is his delight, and he knows that he never did anything from sheer duty—the Puritan's dearest self-illusion—never anything from sheer holy duty that was worth doing. It is true that the excitement and high forces that underlie all great creations are the same,

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regardless of the immediate occasion; it is all some acceleration of life-forces, but your true outsider will not have it that way. It must be all professionalized, be given functions peculiar to it, have an office apart.

The popular mind—whether it can put it or not—has its own idea of highbrow. *Highbrow* for the people carries with it a dutiful obligation to respect, admire and enjoy; something they feel instinctively to be generically different from the vibrancy of art, outside the thing itself and either conscientious or affected; carries a plea to admire because you ought—which the raw public knows—as the artist knows—is the last reason in the world for admiration. Ought is the deadliest word in art. Moreover, into this special and reverent and esoteric admiration—as in many forms of godliness—is likely to creep the ego: one's initiation and understanding is one's distinction. For pride is the serpent in the garden of art. The devotee has the key to the shrine, the temple fillets distinguish his brow. For that matter it may be true, for example, that we understand the Primavera and all Botticelli best when we know—and love—the Greek Anthology, the Bacchae, the Adonis Lament, and Spencer, Marot, Il Magnifico; because these are related fields of artistic expression, and because the channels of life have changed and the approach to the art-subject has changed with them. But even in such a case we come again at length to where all is simple and mysterious—as life is. The great experience in art should give only humility to the lover of it as great life experience gives humility to the wise man. There is something both mischievous and superficial or pedantic, or all three, about this setting up of art's profundity. Art is profound only as life is profound. Every art has of course its language, as one learns French in order to read French poetry; but to lay claims to cults and subtleties for art is only to imply for it limitations in the application to life. There is indeed nothing profound or holy in art except as life is profound and holy. These proud worshippers are like the bishops who thought less often of God than of his ministers.

These are the people who are apt, consciously or unconsciously, to double themselves but halve art. Better to play a hurdy-gurdy in some abounding gutter! For theirs is the way to kill art. The César Franck at my concert will be a scherzino with a little harlequinade of chords, all puffs and powder and pirouettes and sweeping bows; but my neighbors will have no time to be happy in it, for they are getting educated. L'Arlésienne will follow, but in the face of such reverence, the rhythm that is the life of it will slow up its pulse and will be so correct that the organ-man in New Orleans could play it better. This is the way to kill art by treating it too well, overpowering it with incense and candles; by showing it so much respect that it loses its natural and spontaneous liveliness in recognition of the quality of the occasion. Like an over-honored man who is too polite to shatter our illusions, it takes on gravity and loses unconscious truth. It is overweighted with the seriousness put upon it. To reverence anything as outside of oneself is often dangerous.

This attitude toward art is only another instance of the confusion of moral with intellectual and appreciative values. People who look on art as a subject for reverence and education are willing to substitute moral intention for completer ends. They commend the volitional at the expense of adequate results. But wanting to do right never created or understood a sonata.

And yet it is unfair to imply that these people take no pleasure in art; the point is that they set up a travesty both on art and on themselves by this attempt to relate it all to serious consideration. They are trying to think too much with their heads and not enough with their hearts, as Francis Thompson might say. They are likely to understand reason and the pleasurable, but not joyous despair also, and the logic of unreason, and happy tears. Many of these people may be fooling themselves a little, but they are not posing. They do enjoy their art, but not as they might enjoy it and perceive it if they would only let themselves; for art is a matter of life, and to understand it we must be alive; we must command all avenues of the living approach to it.

Understanding art is essentially a secondary phase of creating it; the creation of art is manner of living; and life is made up of beauty and joy and order and motion and so on and so on, which are parts of the whole life and are as necessary to any whole understanding as are hushed breath and knitted brows and serious purpose. We understand art only by being happy in it, not merely by any partial regard or pious contemplation of it; and we are happy deeply and lastingly only when we are exercised, dilated, swept, when we die to live, when we are in the great currents of being, not of hilarity or culture or reverence, out of which we draw and into which we pour ourselves. What we love in heroes is their vitality, the life abundant welling up in them; in all art life is the hero. The larger satisfaction is in our larger exercise, is in the gamut of our vitality. And art is only another form of being alive.

STARK YOUNG.

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Trivia

The Poplar

THERE is a great tree in Sussex, whose cloud of thin foliage floats high in the summer air. The thrush sings in it, and blackbirds, which fill the late decorative sunshine with a shimmer of golden sound. There the nightingale finds her green cloister; and on those branches sometimes, like a great fruit, hangs the lemon-colored Moon. In the glare of August, when all the world is faint with heat, there is always a breeze in those cool recesses, always a noise, like the noise of water, among its lightly hung leaves.

The owner of this tree lives in London, reading books.

Where Do I Come In?

WHEN I read in the Times about India and all its problems and populations; when I look at the letters in large type of important personages, and find myself face to face with the Questions, Movements, and great Activities of the Age, "Where do I come in?" I ask myself uneasily.

Then in the great Times-reflected world I find the corner where I play my humble but necessary part. For I am one of the unpraised, unrewarded millions without whom Statistics would be a bankrupt science. It is we who are born, who marry, who die, in constant ratios; who regularly lose so many umbrellas, post just so many unaddressed letters every year. And there are enthusiasts among us who, without the least thought of their own convenience, allow omnibuses to run over them, or throw themselves month by month, in fixed numbers, from the London bridges.

The Church of England

I HAVE my Anglican moments, and as I sat there that Sunday afternoon, in the little Palladian interior of the London Church, and listened to the unexpressive voices chanting the correct service, I felt a comfortable assurance that we were in no danger of being betrayed into any unseemly manifestations of religious fervor. We had not gathered together at that performance to abase ourselves with furious hosannas before any dark Creator of an untamed Universe, no Deity of freaks and miracles and sinister hocus-pocus; but to pay our duty to a highly respected Anglican First Cause—undemonstrative, gentlemanly and conscientious—whom, without loss of self-respect, we could sincerely and decorously praise.

L. PEARSALL SMITH.

CORRESPONDENCE

Wants Socialist—Liberal Coalition

SIR: There is no more propitious time for the reactionary politician to remove the safeguards of labor than during a time of war, when, under the cover of patriotism he can raise such shibboleths as "no strikes during war time," and pat labor on the back by placing one or two of its leaders on committees. All liberal, thoughtful men will agree that there is a great need for the people of this country to guard the progress of 141 years. The question is how is it to be done?

Until recently my entire hope lay in the Socialist party. Now, although I cannot completely reconcile myself to the already popular slogan that the Socialist party has ceased to be a salutary instrument for the advancement of socialism, I, nevertheless, have many doubts as to the future prestige and success of the party. Some of the statements of the Socialist leaders are exceedingly unfortunate. The schism in the party is acute. As regards certain vital questions the divisions are diametrically opposed to each other. To talk of reconciliation is folly. An organization which sees absolutely nothing unselfish in this great war is not to be trusted. An organization which is composed of some self-styled intellectuals cannot succeed. The Socialist party is, for the time at least, in noisy dormancy.

I do not and can not denounce the ideals of socialism. No one who understands socialism can denounce it. At present I fail to see an instrument by which we are to reach the Industrial Democracy.

My hope lies in a doctrine long ago condemned by such illustrious Socialists as Liebknecht and Bebel. My hope lies in a coalition of liberal men; a non-partisan league.

Such leagues have been established with varied successes. The Progressive party was such an attempt in a modified form. The most notable success, however, is the North Dakota Non-Partisan League which sent that able spokesman, John M. Baer, to Congress.

I shall immediately be condemned by the Socialists, because, they will say, the class character of the proletarian movement will be weakened by such an alliance. But since only those who are actively in favor of the uplift of the proletarian will join this league, the class character cannot be weakened. It will rather be strengthened by the addition of the most intellectual liberals of the country.

Other Socialists will argue that this is merely a momentary agreement by which socialism, far from being helped, will be retarded. These sentimental Socialists ought to be made to realize that the ultimate aim of socialism is the uplift of the proletarian and the promotion of human welfare, and that if this result can be secured in its highest form without the use of the word "socialism," it is not necessary for the word to exist. It is the idea that goes with it, not the word itself, that counts.

There is a great unorganized Liberal party in America to-day. If this sleeping lion were organized it would by sheer force of numbers secure control of the government.

The Socialists themselves fully realize the importance of having a Socialist Representative in the House. As proof of this we can recall the concentrated London and Hillquit campaigns, and the Gaylord and Berger campaigns in the West. Entire states were neglected in order to make a united effort to add one or two Socialist Representatives. They do realize that a man on the floor of the House is worth a thousand street corner agitators. It is quite paradoxical, then, for them to say that securing Socialist Representatives is not very important, that such spokesmen as

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LaFollette, Thompson, Gronna, Nearing, Amos Pinchot, and Frederic C. Howe are unimportant. Even in this city if all the Liberals would get behind Frederic C. Howe, the greatest American authority on city government, they would elect him mayor.

The Liberals and Socialists express differently the same fundamental ideas. They both desire and fight to remove the inequality of life.

Both Liberals and Socialists have this thought uppermost in mind: A political democracy is helpless under an industrial autocracy.

GUSTAV SMULEWITZ.

New York City.

Defends Socialist Party

SIR: The Socialists do not seem to be able to please anybody any more. When the European war broke out, they were condemned because they apparently abandoned their doctrine of international solidarity and voted to help defend their respective countries. Now, when the American Socialists maintain their historic position and refuse to endorse our war, The New Republic berates them as a "sect of hyphenates."

I may pass over the propriety of the use of such language on the part of a paper of the calibre of The New Republic, though surely a journal which until quite recently had a prominent ex-socialist on its editorial board might well have left mere vituperation to Mr. Roosevelt or to the Globe. But the charge itself is silly. The majority of the American Socialists have simply not been able to intoxicate themselves with enthusiasm over our entry into the war. They do not consider it a "triumph of the American intellectuals." Nor do they feel that it is a war of the American proletariat to liberate the proletariat of Europe. That would, of course, be their only justification for making war under any circumstances. They have listened not so long ago to President Wilson lecturing the Russian proletariat for their unwillingness to go on being killed to further the imperialistic and capitalistic schemes of foreign governments, and they are now reading our native press in its latest assaults upon everything socialistic.

Their hesitancy certainly does not stamp them as being either hyphenates or pro-Germans. A good many staunch Americans all over the country are still hesitant. Neither the public utterances nor the official acts of such men as Hillquit or Berger or Lee or any other spokesmen of the party since the beginning of the war can fairly be characterized as hyphenated. These men have had a realistic conception of the evils of the present German or of the late Russian autocracy long before American radicals revamped the hoary notion that wars are dynastic and not economic, and that all that is necessary is to remove a few wicked rulers and their consorts. Many of them have escaped from the tyranny of these autocracies and have felt their blight again as delegates to proposed international Socialistic congresses.

In the same issue in which The New Republic berates American Socialists it also criticises Mr. Gompers for refusing, with so much patriotic virtue, to attend the Stockholm conference. Yet the same arguments would surely apply with even greater force to allow Socialist delegates to attend. It is both a dangerous and a fallacious assumption that in this country alone Socialists have not gained in power since 1914. Inquiry at almost any Socialist local will show an increase in enrollment which can be directly related to recent events.

ALFRED BOOTH KUTTNER.

No Pacifist "Rights"

SIR: As one of the group known as conscientious objectors, I confess that I have not seen, even in your columns, a statement of the case that satisfies me. The discussion seems a bit confused.

The point at issue now is whether the man who refuses on moral grounds to take up arms shall be sent to jail or allowed his liberty. The pacifist objector is now called upon to show cause why he should not be disciplined along with other opponents of the public will. The possible merit of his contention, or even the probable ingenuousness of his plea, cannot determine the government's action. Such a defense of the pacifist as Mr. Norman Thomas offers, or such an apology for him as Mr. John Dewey makes, valid though they may be, can hardly be called pertinent to the main issue. The country is at war, and the government must decide what treatment the public safety demands for the man who will not fight.

Now, I believe the case for the pacifist objector can be won on this ground, but it will never be won by talking about the right of conscience, the rights of the minority, and that sort of thing. Such arguments as these ill become a group of people who espouse the liberal philosophy, which, I take it, most pacifists profess. War and nationalism are taken for granted by the uncritical, conservative mind. It is to the liberal wing of political thought that the pacifist properly belongs. It is distressing therefore to hear him clamoring for his "rights." The very concept of ultimate personal rights belongs to the passing individualism which he opposes. The defenders of the "constitutional right of free speech" are the very same people who oppose vigorously, and I think rightly, the method of determining moral issues by a century-old instrument. It may even happen that the war will set some wholesome and liberating precedents for unconstitutional action. But the point here is that no individual right can traverse that of the nation at large. If the government reaches the conclusion that the conscientious objector is a nuisance, it has no choice but to imprison him. And to be consistent he must go like a man, and without rancor, if the government as the instrument of the majority so determines. He may fairly contend that in this case the people have at no time been privileged to speak on the question, and the true minority has not yet been defined. But in the face of a decision that must pass for that of the people, the pacifist makes an unworthy spectacle contending for his "rights." He has no such transcendental rights to defend.

The proper aim of the pacifist in this crisis is to show that the public good does *not* require his forcible suppression. He can with all reason maintain that no matter how great an ass he may be thought, he can render more service to the country by bearing his customary burdens than by occupying a stall somewhere at the government's expense. When it appears that the customary employment of the pacifist is not infrequently of the sort called social service, and that the objectors are not, in general, people with police court records, the case should be sufficiently clear.

We are far more likely, I believe, to gain a hearing if we accept the limitation which the government, once a war is undertaken, is obliged to put upon those who are understood to have engaged in a destructive enterprise. Unless we can prove our availability for service in spite of our dissent on the war issue, we must expect the same treatment as those who seek to pollute the water supply, or those who obstruct inoculation against imminent plague.

F. ERNEST JOHNSON.

New York City.

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Orthodox

Faith, War, and Policy, addresses and essays on the European War, by Gilbert Murray. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. $1.25.

BEFORE the war an admirer of Gilbert Murray might have guessed that he would certainly contribute to thought rather than propaganda in the case of a European war. Propaganda is one way of stimulating the will of the people and directing public destinies. It is used by every sect in every cause, by suffragists and liquor-dealers and street-car presidents and labor advocates and Blue Cross ladies and patriots who want all stray dogs converted at once into fertilizer and boots. There is nothing creditable or discreditable about propaganda in itself, it is an activity as appropriate to Miss Jane Addams of Hull-House as to Ivy Lee of the whispered policies of the rich. Its nature, however, presupposes either a unique cause to plead or an aptitude for pleading. Gilbert Murray had made no rule of pleading, like the Hall Caines or the Conan Doyles or even the Gilbert Parkers; and it was a ready assumption that he would be unlikely to take any simple patriotic cause for his own. Such an assumption was foolish and superficial. It only proves that one may gain impressions about men of literature that are fortuitous as personal impressions of dancers or singers.

There is a Gilbert Murray writing in this volume who fulfils a high expectation. This is the man who writes so composedly and candidly about Arthur George Heath, his friend and pupil who was killed at Loos. There is scarcely a word in this truly noble account which anyone could wish to have altered. It is not an account written in the sepulchral tone of the black-gloved. It is not suffocating with the sweetness of mortuary flowers. The hard work and unassuming gentleness and easy humor of Heath are composed into a living personality before the circumstances of his death come to be movingly detailed. One is then prepared to receive Mr. Murray's tribute to Heath and other equally gifted Oxford men whose death he is recording, men "of an extraordinary and yet unconscious high-mindedness," men with "a habit of living for things of the spirit," who died for things of the spirit, foregoing their rich endowment, their pledges to scholarship and science and laborious days. One is glad to read of such human beings, to see them all the way from school-boy humor through the realities of fear and disaster into the twilight in sunlight that is a young man's death.

In addition to Oxford and the War there are flashes throughout these pages of a personal intensity of experience. "They were once James Mitchell, the clerk; Thomas Brown, the railway porter; John Baxter, the Wesleyan carpenter. But now they are 'Tommies.' And we invent a curious psychology for them, to persuade ourselves somehow that they like the things they do, and do not so very much mind the things they suffer. And then, in spite of the pretences we build up in order to make ourselves comfortable, there continues underneath the brazen armour of our contentment a secret horror, a raging irritation—how shall I put it? It is the ceaseless, bitter sobbing of all that used once to be recognized as the higher part of our nature, but now is held prisoner, stifled and thrust aside . . . because the need of the world is for other things. And some of us throw up the moral struggle and go blindly for pacificism." That is poignant expression of one mood in wartime, and there is another fine perceptive passage beginning, "Human nature is a mysterious thing, and man finds his weal and woe not in the obvious places." Such passages give one a glimpse of molten moralities and the heart in the crucible of pain. They are not direct propaganda, however, and are therefore subordinate to Mr. Murray's main purposes. And he would not elect, I suppose, to be read merely for these irradiations of his spirit.

But his propaganda is not altogether a pleasant thing to contemplate. Gilbert Murray is one of the few men in England whose background would seem fitted to a capacious reception of the tragedy of the war. His touch among the classics has been freshly imaginative, contemporizing the heroic and animating the gods. All that is to be said for Greek culture could be said for him; and there is nothing that culture can better give than scope, perspective and detachment for an age-old political catastrophe. A man is no man, people may say, who cannot share "the quickened pulse, the new strength and courage, the sense of brotherhood, the spirit of discipline and self-sacrifice" which are generated when the herd is threatened. "Yet, after all," in Mr. Murray's own words, "we are thinking beings. If we acknowledge our instincts, we need not worship them." It is because of this truth that pious and unreasoning partisanship is so hard to bear in the author's case. If one disliked enormously to have officialdom give the cue to every eminent German professor, it was partly because the cause was a bad one but also because, good or bad, the rôle of apologist and special pleader is not consonant with the devotion to truth that one expects from a teacher. The same thing applies to Professor Murray, and it is difficult not to be continually reminded in this volume of the poorer sorts of patriotism that make the chauvinist and the jingo.

The most powerful impression to be derived from these papers, for instance, is one of English self-praise. It is not simply that Mr. Murray seems almost completely unaware that France and Russia and Italy are, after all, fighting in this war. It is also and peculiarly that he eulogizes England on every occasion, until his particularism becomes stifling. One is familiar with the person who is always ready to say that any conduct he dislikes is un-American. Mr. Murray has a similar cant phrase, un-English—"a bad and foolish and un-English impulse struggling to obtain power and being very properly crushed." "That is not the way in which Great Britain makes war—or, please God, ever will make war—by starving a lot of little enemy children whom we happen to have in our hands." Waive the question of the Boer concentration camps. Even so, why so eager to admit virtue? The eagerness of the Germans to admit their own virtue ought to sicken every self-eulogist forever.

"Our better natures on the whole rule our public action," Mr. Murray blushingly confesses; "we give our national confidence to our better men. We have behind us a very great tradition. In peace we are the most liberal and the most merciful of all great empires; in war we have Napoleon's famous testimonial, calling us 'the most consistent, the most implacable, and the most generous of his enemies.'" And again, in the same shy spirit, "We are a country of ripe political experience, of ancient freedom; we are, with all our faults, I think, a country of kindly record and generous ideals, and we stand for the established tradition of good behavior between nations. We stand for the observance of treaties and the recognition of mutual rights, for the tradition of common honesty and common kindliness between nations and nation; we stand

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for the old decencies, the old humanities, 'the old ordinance,' as the King's letter put it, 'the old ordinance that has bound civilized Europe together.'" And then an interpretation of the attitude of the angels toward the British—non Angli, sed Angeli: "The fact seems to be that if, some years ago, an angel had set himself to the task of saving Europe, he would not have begun by altering British policy."

Much that Mr. Murray says for England is gloriously said, and is clearly intended to "uphold the banner of the ideal," but his whole propagandist attitude seems to me to get seriously the better of him in his controversy with Arthur Bullard on the Sea Policy of Great Britain. Because Sweden and Greece did not do what Britain wanted, something was morally the matter with Sweden and Greece—that is the inevitable inference from Mr. Murray's talk. "The war does impose on neutrals a considerable amount of hardship, there is no use denying it," but Mr. Murray does not see why neutrals, in the name of a cause that to him is unquestionable, cannot put up with such "unavoidable" hardships. If they resist, he inclines to use words like "fraud," "unconstitutional," "breach of treaty" and so on. He even says naïvely, "The Greek Government has provided us with abundant casus belli." One might fairly suppose that the procuration of casus belli was too stale a device to be mentioned seriously by Mr. Murray for a single moment, but he makes it only too clear that once a man assumes his cause to be sacred his imagination about the other fellow goes numb. It is just this that makes possible Mr. Murray's chatter about "impractical idealists," the phrase that is so common in prosperous suburbs. "The more impulsive young men and women, idealist, cranky, rebellious, malcontent, disappointed"—this kind of characterization ought really to be saved for the exclusive use of bank presidents.

The case for liberty is not so strong that Mr. Murray can be discredited by a little evidence that his arteries have hardened. There is a case for order as against liberty, even where small nationalities are concerned. The only trouble is, Mr. Murray beats the German dog with the stick of self-righteousness, failing altogether to account for the less immediate and less nationalistic issues that now are emerging through the conflict, and that propose a revision of the whole structure of monarchical Europe rather than the redemption of the status quo from the nationalistic collision. Because of his admiration for Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey, Gilbert Murray has laid all his emphasis on the liberalism of England and his pride in England as it is. The feebleness of his book, on this account, is a conventional tepidity on the whole problem of democratic control and an orthodoxy in patriotism that establishes his place much too fixedly as "just outside the circle of official politics."

The Germans must be fought—that is a condition on which Mr. Murray's readers will agree, but the more thoughtful readers will not, I feel convinced, be satisfied with Mr. Murray's examination of the reasons. The prime cause of this dissatisfaction will not, I imagine, be any impatience with Mr. Murray's temper. It will more likely be a detection of his infancy in international interpretation. Had Mr. Murray confined himself to personal psychology he would have been an admirable propagandist. It is his attempt to stretch an inelastic British orthodoxy over a world situation that makes him seem strained and inadequate.

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War Activities for Civilians

National Service Handbook, issued by the Committee on Public Information, Government Printing Office, Washington.

WHILE I was writing for publication in these columns a plea for a war psychology which should appeal to the intelligent desires of the country rather than to its blinder emotions, there came into my hands an advance copy of the handbook of information which has been prepared and issued by the Division of Civil and Educational Coöperation of the Committee on Public Information. This book of two hundred and fifty pages is not "literature" which demands review; being a compendium of information, itself highly condensed, it can hardly be summarized—there are, for example, ten pages in the table of contents merely listing various phases of public activity in connection with the war. Some of the larger headings are the maintenance of standards of labor; welfare and philanthropic service at home; agencies for European war relief, the names and addresses of over a hundred being listed; religious organizations doing service; the capacities in which professional men and women can be of use; the financing of the war; the special impact of war on industry and commerce; agriculture and food supply; medical and nursing service—all this and more, besides full information as to the various lines of service in army, navy and aviation. The quality of the work as revealed by a number of samplings is equal to its wide scope; it is informed by discriminative intelligence. The usefulness of the book

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for reference purposes in libraries and newspaper offices, and for any individual who has some service to offer and wishes to know where and how to present it can hardly be overestimated. But I confess that my motive is not so much to call attention to an extremely useful and well done piece of work as it is to point a moral. Here is a specimen, in a limited but significant field, of that appeal to desire for knowledge, for intelligent direction of effort toward definitely apprehended and stated ends, which seems to me the obviously needed and obviously efficacious thing in our war preparedness. I can but think the fact that the book is so directly an outcome of the efforts of young college men who have volunteered for service at Washington is a good omen. One hopes that it is truly indicative of our national temper that instead of blind and partisan propaganda we are given light.

J. D.

Pleasures of Attention

Great Companions, by Edith Wyatt. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $1.50.

WHY does Miss Wyatt's record of her pleasure in books invigorate her reader and awake ambition? And why anyhow should any one enjoy nowadays being roused to feel that reading is a way of adventure, which needs close attention, ready perception, quick choice? Despair of any comfortable stability anywhere seems inevitable. Snug literary criticism should be welcome, as at least peaceable and livable and unexacting. It might serve to give a fresh wash of color to the good old orderlinesses, to the old easy pleasure of going to school. Miss Wyatt's way of criticism, on the contrary, throws one back on oneself, without any help but what she describes as "the belief that nothing else is so vital and so thrilling an adventure as to know one's own life, in one's own place on this actual earth of one's own day and generation." Every one who reads with any vitality must make his own relations with books. Testimony to "the profound poetry of realization, the poetry of knowing life," is what Miss Wyatt particularly wishes to find. Her happiness about such testimony is her subject—not literary judgments we can accept without bother. We are challenged, rather, to be alert and attentive for ourselves.

Are we drawing on those usually unused forces of energy doctors now insist we possess, that we are not in a mood to put up with smugness and insignificance anywhere? Economics and political theory are so shifting, why insist on every one's looking alive, even the readers of novels? One can remember less serious days, when Miss Wyatt's vitality might not have been so simply refreshing. Inattention used, perhaps, to seem only craftily selective. Yet to-day her defiance is victorious: "Absolute attention. I think it is the most distinguished faculty on earth—surely the most tonic." Her belief in their absolute attention is what makes her describe James Whitcomb Riley, Defoe, Walt Whitman, Frank Norris, Mr. Howells, Thoreau, John Muir, the "Woman Homesteader," Stephen Crane, Henry James and Henri Fabre. Such a list might suggest a wandering fancy. But they have all alike given Miss Wyatt "genuine news about life" and added to her "clear discriminations of truth."

She has read Americans with particular responsiveness, deeply feeling the privilege of America, the chance our democracy has given us so far, and the beauty of the vastness of our plains and forests. The Middle West may rightly seem to many people, she declares, "the natural home of a spirit inexpressibly spacious, plain, and free." When she read Riley's Raggedy Man to a night class of young Russians and Poles, she felt in their pleasure a tribute to a "certain magic of interpretation." "Something of our own, not like the spirit of other lands, something better far indeed than we are often able to be, and better than our thoughts or any of the formulae, but somehow like our best fleet instincts, spoke truly to alien listeners in the genius of this poem sung as lightly as the wind blew down the locust blossoms on the shed roof."

"Our vast, alien Americanizing populations, the presence of the Panama Canal, uncounted present-day observations tell us that one of the most stirring conditions of this country and this continent is that they are still the scene of great migrations. . . . Something in us rises free and self-sustaining upon a great adventure." Such feeling for our inheritance excites emulation. Why disregard our particular chance for imagination?

Miss Wyatt, one fancies, discouraged an early pleasure in more purely literary discriminations. Her susceptibility to Henry James is, perhaps, a little unlike her later companionships. He ignored "the error and irrationality of the present social order," all "vital concerns" which have absorbed "much of the most intense, most uncompromising, most creative and characteristic thought of our time." Yet she can say that his "production has, as a whole, illumined the world for his readers more than the effort of any other author." Her sensitiveness to art in itself might have led her away from the larger society she chose to be much aware of. There was surely great pleasure in just the "doing" of her early book, True Love—those stories of Chicago that made many imaginations laugh and grow.

It is a tribute to the happiness and intimacy of Miss Wyatt's friendships that one has no wish to dispute with her. One fears to interrupt. The truth of her feeling is serenely strong. It is—at least one hopes it is—only pretense or half-heartedness that makes one quarrelsome.

E. B.

Recent Publications

Trench Warfare, by J. S. Smith, Second Lieutenant with the British Expeditionary Force. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. $1.50.

THERE is the refreshing lack of ethical or political judgments characteristic of the true soldier in this practical handbook of trench warfare. The war has become —as it always becomes to the active officer—a game of intricate and sometimes baffling technical problems. Consciousness is absorbed into multifarious but specific and visible tasks. Even if there were the inclination, there is no leisure for any ulterior considerations beyond the skilful playing of a difficult and admittedly mussy game. Lieutenant Smith, an American who has seen many months of active service in the British forces, has written an admirable little manual for the men to whom trench warfare is as yet only a name. He describes the formation for attacks and bombing parties, the duties of officers, the types of machine guns and hand grenades and how to operate them "under normal circumstances" and in an emergency, the construction of dugouts with the different resistances of stone, wood, or dirt roofs, communication

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trenches, "sumps" where the mud is pushed or shoveled, the "latrine" with its pail of ever-present disinfectant to make the offal unattractive to rats and vermin, recesses, listening posts, barbed wire, "traverses," barricades, front line "shelters," etc. There are instructions on how to avoid trench feet, how to meet a gas attack, how to exploit the listening posts with the least danger and most profitable results. "During the winter months," writes the author calmly, "a trench is never really drained. A mixture in the trenches which is neither water nor good, sticky mud, but a beautiful liquid combination of water and dirt, which is thick enough not to run, is formed. Sometimes it becomes sufficiently like water to be pushed or assisted to run down hill. . . . Sometimes it becomes sufficiently heavy to be shoveled over the parapet . . . but when the mud is in its true clayed self it is a waste of time and labor to attempt to move it, and the only way, without a large amount of cursing, is to sit tight and pray for the sun to dry it." There are many questions an officer should ask himself on taking over a trench. "Do I worry the enemy as much as I might?" is the chief one, according to the author. Also, "do as much damage to the enemy with the minimum amount of casualties resulting from retaliation." Of course Lieutenant Smith does not have to add that the same admirable sentiments animate the breast of the enemy officer. But he is right—that is just the duty of the officer. That is all he has to remember of general principles. Perhaps the men remember, too. They must remember the one-time comparative sanity of the world; the comparative decency and cleanliness of the home that they have left for this mud and gloom of boredom and fixation of impulse on an abnormal activity of killing. Many have endured it for three years. Is it sentimentalism to believe that most have suffered it so long only that their children shall never experience it or mankind again?

Pictures of War Work in England, by Joseph Pennell (Reproductions of 51 Drawings and Lithographs); Notes by the Artist and Introduction by H. G. Wells. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. $1.50.

MR. PENNELL hates war, and it is not surprising that to him the real protagonist in the drama of the present conflict should be iron rather than man. He finds great beauty in the smudge of mushroom munition towns and the grimy bewilderment of busy foundries and blast furnaces. The great door of the steel shop is compared to a temple entrance; the chains from the roof, to swinging incense bearers; the gun turret has the proportions of a primitive altar. Ancient art had ties with religion, writes Mr. Pennell, but modern art is allied with science. So it is the sprawling and jagged factory city with its curl of soft smoke against the pleasant green of the far-away countryside which to him constitutes the thrilling landscape. The mighty proportions of huge cranes and fiery hammers have a deep vitality and significance of their own. Something of that strange anthropomorphic life with which Hardy can imbue even an ordinary cross-road, over which dead autumn leaves are swirling as if caressingly Mr. Pennell lets be conveyed through his sketches of these new and tireless industrial giants. One may not agree with Wells that Mr. Pennell's "sketchy and transient human figures seem altogether right," although there is something appropriate in making the men and women flung against these remorseless and grinding producers of death merely secondary figures. But one cannot disagree with those who will say they find Mr. Pennell's art at its highest point in these drawings—an underlying and basic realism of stern proportion and clean, definite form wrapped in a kind of romantic penumbra of shaded lines and vague, smoky chiaroscuro.

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

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